Friday, September 29, 2017

A Square Conflict in Recent Appellate Division Decisions Regarding the Unemployment Statute

Blake v. Board of Review, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2017).  In McClain v. Board of Review, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2017), discussed here, a panel of the Appellate Division recently addressed an amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) that allows persons who leave a job voluntarily to receive unemployment benefits where the person […]

The post A Square Conflict in Recent Appellate Division Decisions Regarding the Unemployment Statute appeared first on Appellate Law NJ Blog.



from Appellate Law NJ Blog http://ift.tt/2k5BkcC
via IFTTT

Thursday, September 28, 2017

Appellate Division Statistics for the 2016-17 Term

At last night’s New Jersey State Bar Association Appellate Practice Committee meeting, statistics from the 2016-17 Term of the Appellate Division were presented.  Many of them are substantially similar to those of other years, indicating the relative consistency of the Appellate Division from year to year. Reversal and affirmance rates are perhaps of most interest […]

The post Appellate Division Statistics for the 2016-17 Term appeared first on Appellate Law NJ Blog.



from Appellate Law NJ Blog http://ift.tt/2ftviO3
via IFTTT

You've Been Fired, What's Next?

Recently, I wrote a short columnabout starting a new job and the importance of knowing your employee rights before you begin work. This was all due to the recent statistic that before you’re 32, you will have an average of 4 different jobs. That blog was all about the start of a new job and new workplace. This is to inform you of some of your rights when leaving a position with a company both on good terms and bad.

Tuesday, September 26, 2017

This Agreement to Arbitrate Will Self-Destruct in 3…2…1…

Arbitration – essentially, a private trial in which the parties hire a fact-finder who serves in lieu of a judge – has become an increasingly common means of resolving family law disputes.  Although an arbitration may be conducted with all the formalities of a trial, usually parties can agree to dispense with certain formalities, some of which can be costly for the parties.  Arbitration takes a trial out of the sometimes messy court system, usually guarantees a decision will be made in a timely manner, and ensures that the trial does not become a matter of public record.  In family law matters where the issues can be sensitive and the testimony potentially embarrassing to the parties, this may be preferred by the parties.

Another advantage to arbitration is that the litigants are not beholden to the deadlines of the Court system.  They can move on with their lives and even get divorced, while agreeing to defer certain issues to arbitration on a more relaxed timelines.  But sometimes this can backfire.

In a recent unpublished (non-precedential) decision, Shah v. Shah, the Appellate Division addressed the question:  “What happens to an agreement to arbitrate when nobody arbitrates?”

The answer given by the Appellate Division is an interesting one, especially in light of the facts of the Shah case.  In a nutshell, here they are:

  • The Shahs entered into an agreement resolving at least some of their issues in January 2003.  As to those issues that were not resolved (and there were a whopping seventeen of them), they agreed that they would proceed to arbitration.  They agreed on an arbitrator, paid his retainer, and set a date for arbitration.  However, the arbitration did not go forward and after several years passed, Arbitrator # 1 returned the retainer.
  • In 2008, the parties mutually agreed upon a new arbitrator, Arbitrator # 2.  However, neither of them took any steps to retain him.
  • In 2009, Mr. Shah filed a motion to compel the arbitration, expand the scope of the arbitration beyond the seventeen issues identified in the parties’ agreement, and appoint a new arbitrator.  The Court granted Mr. Shah’s motion and appointed Arbitrator # 3.  The Court also entered a discovery schedule, and entered an order directing the parties as to the manner in which Arbitrator # 3’s retainer would be paid.  Despite Mrs. Shah’s apparent attempts to move forward with Arbitrator # 3, Mr. Shah did nothing.  Eventually, Arbitrator # 3 wrote to the Court to, understandably, advise that he would not arbitrate until his retainer agreement was signed.  Neither party signed it.
  • In 2015 (now twelve years after the parties agreed to arbitrate), Mr. Shah once again asked the Court to compel the arbitration, this time asking that Arbitrator # 2 be appointed.  Mrs. Shah cross-moved.  Among other things, she asked the Court to terminate the parties’ obligation to arbitrate.  The Court granted Mrs. Shah’s request, reasoning that – twelve years later – the parties were in very different financial circumstances and could not be made to arbitrate at this point.  The Court also opined that the parties had waived their rights to arbitrate.
  • Mr. Shah moved for reconsideration of the Court’s Order, which the Court denied.

That brings us to Mr. Shah’s appeal.  In pertinent part, Mr. Shah argued that the decision of the lower court should be reversed because the judge incorrectly concluded that the parties had waived their rights to arbitrate due, essentially, to the passage of time.

The Appellate Division agreed with the judge below and concluded that the parties had waived their rights to arbitrate.  This is an interesting conclusion in light of the definition of a waiver:

Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. The intent to waive need not be stated expressly, provided the circumstances clearly show that the party knew of the right and then abandoned it, either by design or indifference. [internal citations omitted].

Indeed, under the facts of the Shah case, there was no question that the parties had unduly delayed in proceeding to arbitration.  Mr. Shah apparently admitted to the Court that he was unhappy with Arbitrator # 3’s fee and therefore did nothing to move forward with the court-appointed arbitrator he had asked for in the first place.

At the same time, there were efforts over the years to move forward with the arbitration.  The major consideration the Appellate Division seems to have made was the amount of time that had passed, regardless of the fact that the parties had – at various points over that time period – made efforts to move forward with the arbitration.  One can imagine that this could be a closer call under even a slightly different set of facts.  For example, what if the facts were identical, but had occurred over the course of five years instead of twelve?

What is clear is that at some point, if parties do not arbitrate then the right to do so is waived, even if the parties have an agreement in place to proceed to arbitration, and one of them wants to enforce it.


headshot_diamond_jessicaJessica C. Diamond is an associate in the firm’s Family Law Practice, resident in the Morristown, NJ, office. You can reach Jessica at (973) 994.7517 or jdiamond@foxrothschild.com.



from NJ Family Legal Blog http://ift.tt/2yoRNes
via IFTTT

3 Domestic Violence Myths that Most People Believe

There are a number of common misconceptions surrounding domestic violence, many of which can be harmful to victims looking to get out of their situations. The following are three of the most common misconceptions about domestic violence that many people believe and the real truth behind the myths.

Toys’R Us Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, What That Means

If you have read the news lately I am sure you are aware that Toys’R Us has filed for bankruptcy. Toys’R Us is the third largest company to go through a chapter 11 bankruptcy, which is a type of ‘reorganization bankruptcy. It’s primarily used when a company needs to restructure its debts to move forward, at least for the time being. Chapter 11 can help stave off immediate foreclosure through using its assets to pay off portions of its debts over time. This doesn’t mean the ending of the company, as GM showed in 2009 when it went through a similar restructuring, a business can emerge from the bankruptcy process and still have a future.

Monday, September 25, 2017

Two More Accelerated Criminal Appeals for the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court announced two new grants of review. Both are criminal cases, and the Court accelerated the proceedings in both appeals. Each of them will be set down for oral argument on November 28 or 29. In both cases, any motion for leave to paticipate as amicus must be filed (along with the proposed […]

The post Two More Accelerated Criminal Appeals for the Supreme Court appeared first on Appellate Law NJ Blog.



from Appellate Law NJ Blog http://ift.tt/2xv7xgy
via IFTTT

Thursday, September 21, 2017

Knowing Your Employment Rights Securing a Future

A few generations ago it was the normal to work your whole life in a single field or career. The last twenty years have seen a dramatic shift with people switching jobs to attempt to stay in demand as the workforce changes. It’s now a fact that before you’re 32 you will have an average of 4 different jobs. Take also into account that a 2014 Forbes article maintained that people who stay in the same job longer than two years make 50% less due to a mix of small yearly increases and high inflation.

Wednesday, September 20, 2017

Last-Minute Motions in Limine Cannot Properly be Used Instead of Properly Noticed Dispositive Motions

L.C. v. M.A.J., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2017).  In Cho v. Trinitas Regional Medical Center, 443 N.J.  Super. 461 (App. Div. 2016), discussed here, Judge Espinosa wrote an opinion that stated emphatically that a motion in limine right before trial that seeks dismissal or summary judgment is not only unauthorized under the Court […]

The post Last-Minute Motions in Limine Cannot Properly be Used Instead of Properly Noticed Dispositive Motions appeared first on Appellate Law NJ Blog.



from Appellate Law NJ Blog http://ift.tt/2xnZW59
via IFTTT

Tuesday, September 19, 2017

Toys “R” Us Files For Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection

Wayne, NJ-based Toys “R” Us filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of Virginia (Richmond) on Monday (Case no. 17-34665). Toys “R” Us operates more than 1,600 locations for both Toy “R” Us and Babies “R” Us and employs approximately 64,000 people. The chain is seeking borrow money in order to pay suppliers by restructuring $5 billion in long-term debt. The company noted that the approaching holiday shopping season accounts for 40% of its net sales.

Prior to the filing, almost all the company’s vendors sought cash in advance before shipping products, forcing Toys “R” Us to raise $1 billion for suppliers. The company’s debt is attributed to a $6.6 billion buyout in 2005 led by KKR & Co. LP, Bain Capital LP and Vornado Realty Trust.

If you are a landlord or trade creditor of Toys “R” Us, it is important to know your rights now. Stark & Stark’s Shopping Center and Retail Development Group can help.

Our bankruptcy attorneys regularly represent landlords and trade creditors throughout the country, including recently in the Eastern District of Virginia, Eastern District of Missouri, District of New Jersey, Southern District of New York, District of Delaware, District of Minnesota and the Western and Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania regarding a variety of issues. Most recently, our Group has represented landlords and trade creditors in the Payless, Gymboree, Eastern Outfitters (EMS Part 2), EMS, Golfsmith, RadioShack, General Wireless (RadioShack 2), Gander Mountain, A&P, Joyce Leslie, rue21, Central Grocers and Sports Authority chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.

For more information on how Stark & Stark can assist you, please contact either Tom Onder at (609)219-7458 or tonder@stark-stark.com or Joe Lemkin at (609)791-7022 or jlemkin@stark-stark.com.



from New Jersey Law Blog http://ift.tt/2xf3ViO
via IFTTT

Monday, September 18, 2017

Terrified Teacher Will Have Her Day in High Court

            A teacher, who says she’s suffered P.T.S.D. after 3 students became verbally and physically aggressive with her, will have her case heard by the NJ Supreme Court. In April of this year an Appellate Division court stated in a split decision she was not entitled to the higher rate of benefits she sought. Due to that split decision she was automatically allowed to seek an appeal of the ruling.

Friday, September 15, 2017

In a Construction Defect Case, the Supreme Court Again Clarifies Statute of Limitations Law

The Palisades at Fort Lee Condominium Association, Inc. v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, ___ N.J. ___ (2017).  This opinion, by Justice Albin for a unanimous Court, involved a lengthy construction defect litigation.  The issue was when the plaintiff condominium association’s claims “accrued” for purposes of the six-year property damage statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.  That […]

The post In a Construction Defect Case, the Supreme Court Again Clarifies Statute of Limitations Law appeared first on Appellate Law NJ Blog.



from Appellate Law NJ Blog http://ift.tt/2y40iLM
via IFTTT

Thursday, September 14, 2017

How Millennials are Changing Prenuptial Perception

With the ever diversifying American family dynamic, it’s important to know legally how to protect yourself for the future. A census report from 2016 revealed that 8 out of 10 people won’t be married until around the age of 45, compare that to the age of 30 in the 1970’s. In a related stat, 62% of attorneys polled saw an increase in the number of 18-34 year olds looking to assemble a prenuptial agreement. As the marrying age has changed so too has there been a change in the once taboo idea of a prenuptial agreement.

Wednesday, September 13, 2017

Volunteer Fireman is Not an “Employee” of His Volunteer Fire Company for Purposes of CEPA

Sauter v. Colts Neck Volunteer Fire Co. No. 2, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2017).  The Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14 (“CEPA”) protects “employees who report illegal or unethical work-place activities.”  CEPA defines an “employee” as one who “performs services for and under the control and direction of an employer for […]

The post Volunteer Fireman is Not an “Employee” of His Volunteer Fire Company for Purposes of CEPA appeared first on Appellate Law NJ Blog.



from Appellate Law NJ Blog http://ift.tt/2x2otwe
via IFTTT

Tuesday, September 12, 2017

A Class above the Rest: Getting to Know Schedule I Narcotics

Opiate addiction has become a massive epidemic in this country, with little signs of it slowing down. Recently a panel of experts met in Washington DC to attempt to figure out some solutions in at the very least slowing it down. The CDC has stated that deaths from opiate overdoses have more than quadrupled over the last 15 years. This has and will continue to put a great strain on our communities. The substances are broken down into three levels or schedules according to the DEA’s assessment of their danger. At the top are Schedule I and carry with them the strongest penalties for possession or depending on the amount intent to sell. The DEA defines this group as having three significant attributes:

Monday, September 11, 2017

Three More Cases to be Reviewed by the Supreme Court

Today, the Supreme Court announced that it has granted review in three cases.  All three cases involve grants of certification, and one of them also is an appeal as of right due to a dissent by Judge Ostrer in the Appellate Division. Thompson v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers Pension & Annuity Fund is […]

The post Three More Cases to be Reviewed by the Supreme Court appeared first on Appellate Law NJ Blog.



from Appellate Law NJ Blog http://ift.tt/2gZnLGY
via IFTTT

The New Term’s First Grant of Supreme Court Review

Kicking off its new term, the Supreme Court announced its first grant of review last Friday.  The Court granted leave to appeal in State v. Dickerson, another case under the Criminal Justice Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26.  The question presented, as phrased by the Supreme Court Clerk’s Office, is “Is the State required to […]

The post The New Term’s First Grant of Supreme Court Review appeared first on Appellate Law NJ Blog.



from Appellate Law NJ Blog http://ift.tt/2xsfAxN
via IFTTT

Why Do People Choose the Simon Law Group?

Whether it’s a ticket for going a few miles over the speed limit or assembling your will, your future may depend on hiring the right lawyer. According to a 2017 American Bar Association study there are over 40,000 active lawyers in the state of NJ. Choosing one that will dedicate their full abilities to your needs can seem like a daunting task.   

Friday, September 8, 2017

Election Law Enforcement Commission Can Pursue Complaint Against Essex County Executive

New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission v. DiVincenzo, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2017).  In 2011, the New Jersey Election Law Commission (“ELEC”), an independent four-member body that enforces the Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Reporting Act, N.J.S.A. 19:44A-1 to -77 (‘the Act”), voted unanimously to investigate alleged violations of that statute by in the […]

The post Election Law Enforcement Commission Can Pursue Complaint Against Essex County Executive appeared first on Appellate Law NJ Blog.



from Appellate Law NJ Blog http://ift.tt/2wPOptm
via IFTTT

Thursday, September 7, 2017

Where Should Custody and Parenting Issues Be Decided?

Sometimes, the location of a case – for one reason or another – can be just as important as anything else.  Perhaps the law is different and more beneficial to one side in a particular location; possibly, one place is simply more convenient for purposes of introducing evidence at a trial or merely having all parties be present in court.

In my practice, I have seen this issue come up more and more.  With our increasing mobility, the questions of where a case should be conducted and what court has jurisdiction has become increasingly complex.  This is especially so in cases involving children who reside with the primary parent in another state from the other parent.  Often, this can result in a tug of war between the courts in both states over where post-judgment issues related to the children should be addressed.

One recent case out of the trial court in Essex County squarely addressed this issue.  In B.G. v. L.H., the parties were divorced in New Jersey, but had specifically agreed when they divorced that the mother and children could relocate to Massachusetts, which they did.  The agreement also called for a parenting time schedule which afforded the father parenting time in Massachusetts and in New Jersey, which he exercised.  Significantly, the agreement did address the question of jurisdiction quite clearly, stating:

Each of the parties hereby irrevocably consents and submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of New Jersey for any future custody and parenting time disputes, so long as one parent resides in New Jersey.

After the wife and children relocated to Massachusetts, the husband continued to reside in New Jersey and, as noted above, to exercise parenting time with the children in New Jersey. Eventually, issues arose regarding the children and their time with their father.  This included two complaints to the Massachusetts Department of Children and Family by one child’s teacher and the other child’s doctor.  The Massachusetts DCF conducted an investigation and concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated.  However, this prompted the Mother to institute proceedings regarding custody and parenting time in the Probate and Family Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

And so the basic question arose:  Should the custody and parenting time issues that arose be decided by a Massachusetts Court, or a New Jersey Court?  In this particular case, the answer may seem obvious.  The parties agreed, “irrevocably,” that as long as either of them resided in New Jersey, the courts of the State of New Jersey would have jurisdiction over custody and parenting time disputes.  It was not disputed that the Father continued to reside in New Jersey.  Therefore, based on their agreement, it would seem that New Jersey should continue to have jurisdiction over custody and parenting time issues.

However, the trial court judge went further and conducted an analysis of the issue as though there was no provision in the parties’ Matrimonial Settlement Agreement which addressed this issue.  This is because only the Court can determine if it should relinquish jurisdiction, even where an agreement exists (although the existence of an agreement is an important factor the court must consider, as discussed below).  Judge Passamano’s opinion provides a good overview of how the question of jurisdiction over custody and parenting time issues should be addressed under New Jersey’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (NJUCCJEA):

  1.  Did New Jersey acquire continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over child custody issues?
  2. If so, have circumstances changed so as to divest New Jersey of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction?
  3. And, if circumstances have not changed, then is New Jersey no longer a convenient forum to decide these issues, and is the other state the appropriate forum?

Notably, this procedure prevents a party from doing what the Mother in B.G. v. L.H. tried to do – simply filing an application to modify custody/parenting time in another state’s court.  The state court which originally had jurisdiction must conduct this analysis and affirmatively relinquish its jurisdiction.

Part 1:  Continuing and Exclusive Jurisdiction

Generally speaking, a Court acquires continuing and exclusive jurisdiction as to custody issues when it makes an initial custody determination, or when it modifies a custody determination made by another state as authorized by law.  In B.G. v. L.H., the initial custody determination was made in New Jersey, by a New Jersey Court.  Therefore, the Court proceeded to the next question.

Part 2:  Change of Circumstances

According to the NJUCCJEA, circumstances will have changed so as to divest New Jersey of jurisdiction when either of the following occur.

  1.  A NJ court determines that neither the child, the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with New Jersey and that substantial evidence is no longer available in New Jersey concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
  2. A court of NJ or a court of another state determines that neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently resides in New Jersey

The question of whether there is a significant connection with the state cannot merely be based on whether one party continues to reside in NJ.  Instead, it goes to the relationship between the child and the parent that remains in NJ.  This is where the distinction between what the parties in B.G. v. L.H. contracted for and what the law dictates lies.  The agreement between the parties called merely for the continued residency of one parent in New Jersey, but absent an agreement, the Court must look deeper at the relationship between the parent and the child.  The judge in B.G. v. L.H. opined that, since the children in that case exercised parenting time with the Father in NJ, there existed the requisite significant connection in any event.

Part 3:  Which is the Convenient Forum?

Having decided in favor of New Jersey on the first to issues, a New Jersey Court can still determine that it should relinquish jurisdiction if it finds that it is not a convenient forum, AND that the other state is the appropriate forum.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-71(b), the factors that the Court considers in answering this question are:

  1. Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
  2. The length of time the child has resided outside of the State;
  3. The distance between the court in this State and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
  4. The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
  5. Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
  6. The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including the testimony of the child;
  7. The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
  8. The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues of the pending litigation.

Again, in B.G. v. L.H., Factor 5 makes it impossible to ignore the fact that the parties explicitly, knowingly, and voluntarily, entered into an agreement that New Jersey would continue to have jurisdiction over custody and parenting time disputes so long as either of the parents (obviously, the Father in this case) merely resided in New Jersey.  Although the Court must give some due consideration to the other factors, so long as the best interests of the children – which must always be paramount – are not deleteriously affected by jurisdiction remaining in New Jersey, it would be hard to argue that there should be any other result in the face of such clear cut language in the agreement.

Practice Issues

The B.G. v. L.H. case provides a good lesson to practitioners about the importance of addressing this issue in agreements, especially if one parent’s relocation to another state may be on the horizon.  If you are on the side of the potentially relocating custodial parent, know that a provision like the one the parties entered into in this case may make it more difficult for your client in the event he or she wants New Jersey to relinquish jurisdiction.  By the same token, if you represent a party who may eventually be defending against an attempt to remove jurisdiction to another state, language like that included in the agreement in B.G. v. L.H. will be helpful to your client.


headshot_diamond_jessicaJessica C. Diamond is an associate in the firm’s Family Law Practice, resident in the Morristown, NJ, office. You can reach Jessica at (973) 994.7517 or jdiamond@foxrothschild.com.



from NJ Family Legal Blog http://ift.tt/2wLHlOy
via IFTTT

Right Against Self-Incrimination Preserved for Parents in Cases Involving Child Sexual Abuse

Thankfully, sexual abuse allegations against parents do not often arise in the context of a divorce typical. However, when those scenarios do arise, they bring lawyers, litigants and judges alike in to unchartered territory where they sometimes have to sift through various accounts to get at the truth of the matter.

Twenty years ago, the Appellate Division succinctly described the dilemma Courts often face when dealing with sexual abuse allegations:

This case is an example of a tragic but recurring dilemma in certain family court cases involving allegations of child sexual abuse. On the one hand, there are clearly cases of imagined or even fabricated charges against a parent, especially when raised during the pendency of divorce proceedings. For a parent to stand accused of such an offense is devastating both to that individual, and to the child’s lifelong relationship with the parent. On the other hand, proof of such abuse, especially involving a very young child, is rarely clear, and the potential danger to a child from a reoccurrence, if the suspicions and accusations are well-founded, is enormous.

[P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193, 198 (App. Div. 1999)].

In a subsequent case several years later, the Appellate Division in Segal v. Lynch, 413 N.J.Super. 171 (App. Div. 2010) even carved out a cause of action wherein one parent can sue the other for money damages on the grounds of parental alienation when one makes false sexual abuse allegations against the other:

[W]e are not blind to scenarios in which one parent intentionally or recklessly imbues a child with such calumnious accounts of the other parent, so wicked in their intent and so destructive in their effect, that the situation necessitates civil redress. For example, a case in which one parent falsely and intentionally accuses the other parent of sexually abusing the child is so despicable on its face and so destructive in its effect on the innocent parent that it cries out for compensation which is not available in the Family Part or even in the criminal courts. The same can be said of cases involving parental abduction, where one parent, unlawfully and without the knowledge or consent of the other parent, removes the child to a foreign jurisdiction with the intent of frustrating any lawful means for returning the kidnapped child to the aggrieved parent. In such cases, sound public policy demands that the aggrieved parent and, by extension the innocent abducted child, be given compensation beyond just reunification. Id. (emphasis added).

The recent published decision of E.S. v. H.A., A-3230-14T2 and A-3256-14T2, speaks to a different kind of scenario involving sexual abuse; one where the allegations have been sustained and the parent-child relationship hangs in the balance.

In E.S. the parties had a long history of contentious litigation, involving various domestic violence claims, motions, and the like. Ultimately, the Division of Child Permanency and Placement (DCPP) became involved with the family when allegations were made of sexual abuse against the father as to the parties’ child, Richard.

After various proceedings by the DCPP, at least some of the sexual abuse allegations against the father were sustained.  Thereafter, the mother moved for a suspension of the father’s parenting time.

Following a hearing, the trial court found, by clear and convincing evident, that the father had sexually abused Richard, granted the mother sole legal and physical custody of Richard and denied the father parenting time.  The resulting order further required the father to “comply with certain requirement prior to making any application for parenting time with his some”, including the following:

a.         Admission of wrongdoing;

b.         A psychosexual evaluation by a professional specializing in same; and

c.         Individual therapy.

The father’s subsequent appeal primarily concerned the above requirement that the be required to make an “admission of wrongdoing” prior to making an application for parenting time.  The father argued that requiring him to do so would violate the right against self-incrimination.

Indeed, the right against self-incrimination, although not protected by the New Jersey constitution, is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence and codified in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, which states that every person in New Jersey “has a right to refuse to disclose in an action…any matter that will incriminate him or expose him to penalty…”

Both the United States Supreme Court and our New Jersey courts have consistently held that the state may not force an individual to choose between his or her Fifth Amendment right and another important interest because such choices are deemed to be inherently coercive. It does not matter whether the particular proceeding is itself a criminal prosecution. Rather, “the Fifth Amendment is violated ‘when a State compels testimony by threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered.'” State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 106 (1997).

After a full examination of the case law and surrounding circumstances, the Appellate Division in E.S. reversed the trial court’s decision requiring the father to admit to the sexual abuse allegations prior to making an application for parenting time. Its reasoning was as follows:

Here, the November 2013 and January 2014 orders conditioned any future request by defendant for parenting time upon his admission of “wrongdoing,” which we presume, based on [the expert’s] testimony, means defendant must admit that he sexually abused Richard. Such a requirement compels defendant to waive his privilege against self-incrimination and violates his rights under the Fifth Amendment and our State Constitution.

The Appellate Division further vacated the remaining preconditions that the trial court imposed on the father “prior to any application for parenting time”, reasoning that, “imposition of these other preconditions violated defendant’s right to invoke the equitable powers of the Family Part to modify its order denying him any parenting time.” While the Appellate Division noted that these application may fail absent the father’s efforts to address the issues that the court saw as vital to the reintroduction of parenting time, it made clear that the court should not reach that conclusion in advance of such a request.

Cases involving sexual abuse pose special problems and considerations for our courts.  But this decision makes clear that it is important to note that our judiciary is required to preserve and protect the due process rights of everyone involved in the litigation.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Eliana T. Baer is a contributor to the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and a member of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Eliana practices in Fox Rothschild’s Princeton, New Jersey office and focuses her state-wide practice on representing clients on issues relating to divorce, equitable distribution, support, custody, adoption, domestic violence, premarital agreements and Appellate Practice. You can reach Eliana at (609) 895-3344, or etbaer@foxrothschild.com.



from NJ Family Legal Blog http://ift.tt/2xdObiX
via IFTTT

Judge Espinosa Returns to the Appellate Division (Temporarily)

The Supreme Court announced today that Judge Espinosa has been temporarily assigned to Part E of the Appellate Division from September 1 through September 30, 2017.  That Order amends the General Assignment Order for 2017-18, discussed here, from which Judge Espinosa’s name was absent.

The post Judge Espinosa Returns to the Appellate Division (Temporarily) appeared first on Appellate Law NJ Blog.



from Appellate Law NJ Blog http://ift.tt/2gKVL9Y
via IFTTT

Wednesday, September 6, 2017

Where is the equality in ‘Equitable’ Distribution?

A divorce is an emotional and trying time, it may be difficult to know what your rights are. As attorneys with years of experience in this field, we want everyone to know more about the process of divorce and how their assets are distributed during the dissolution of a marriage. The idea of Equitable Distribution, which is a short hand for the distribution of marital assets, attempts to add some fairness during an arduous process. It breaks down the relationship into quantifiable pieces to be weighed by the judge and balanced to make both parties as equal as possible.     

Tuesday, September 5, 2017

A Split NJ Appeals Court Rules Dashcam Footage is Public Record

A New Jersey appellate court has ruled 2-1 in a decision released on August the 28th that would classify police dashcam footage as public record. The reason for the case was to determine if dashcam footage fell under the umbrella of OPRA. The majority largely upheld an earlier ruling by Vincent Grasso from the Orange County Superior Court who ruled that it was not an exception.  

Tri-Parenting Arrangements and Custody

Changing American Families

Changing social norms and biological advances in reproductive technology have changed the face of the family, in turn creating legal consequences and implications.

Families formed by non-traditional marriages, same-sex couples, and individuals intending to parent alone may use assisted reproductive technology. Assisted reproductive technology and adoption can help create families who may not be biologically related.

Tri-Parenting Arrangements – D.G. and S.H. v. K.S.

One example is a tri-parenting arrangement. In D.G. and S.H. v. K.S., the court addressed issues of custody, relocation, and child support between a same-sex married couple and their female friend. The two men – D.G and his husband, S.H – and their friend, K.S., agreed to conceive and jointly raise a child in a tri-parenting arrangement. The parties agreed to use D.G.’s sperm and K.S.’s egg to conceive the child, and the child was given S.H.’s last name. S.H. would not be biologically related to the child. The parties went to parenting classes and prepared their homes with the intent that the child would reside with all three parents.

In the initial weeks after the baby’s birth, the parties lived together in one home and participated in all parenting tasks. Shortly thereafter, the two men moved to a home near K.S. The parties tri-parented the child amicably for several years.

Eventually, K.S. announced her plan to marry and move to California with the child. Unable to reach an agreement, D.G. and S.H. filed a complaint seeking legal and physical custody, parenting time, and a determination that S.H. was the child’s psychological and legal parent. The couple argued that S.H. was a psychological parent of the child.

What Standard Applies to Tri-Parenting Contested Relocation Cases?

K.S. requested that the Court first establish the standard to be used in analyzing her application to remove the child from New Jersey. She argued that the court should use the standard announced in Baures v. Lewis, which required the Parent of Primary Residence to prove two things: (1) a good faith motive and (2) that the move will not be inimical to the interests of the child. However, on August 8, 2017, the New Jersey Supreme Court abandoned that standard in Bisbing v. Bisbing which is the subject of a blog post here. The Plaintiffs requested that the Court apply the “best interests of the child” standard. The Court reserved decision on the removal standard until the custody determination was made.

The Psychological Parent and Custody

The Court found that S.H. was the child’s psychological parent.In so ruling, the Court looked to the following findings:

  • The Plaintiffs and the defendant mutually agreed to embark on the journey of conceiving and raising a child together;
  • G. consented to, and fostered, the parent-like relationship between S.H. and the child;
  • S. consented to S.H.’s being involved in the child’s life by agreeing to the “tri-parent relationship” prior to conceiving the child and for a significant period following the child’s birth;
  • Both biological parents consented to and encouraged the parenting of the child by S.H., and gave the child S.H.’s surname;
  • H. was involved with raising and nurturing the child since birth;
  • Both S.H. and D.G. had significant, recurring parenting time with the child in K.S.’s household, as well as their own;
  • H. assumed the obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial compensation;
  • H. was integrally involved with the child’s life in a parental role;
  • H. has contributed financially to the expense of raising the child; and
  • H. was in a parental role for over six years, which was a sufficient amount of time to establish a bonded, dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature.

Accordingly, the Court found that S.H. satisfied the four criteria to be a psychological parent.

The Court went on to explain that, once a third party has been determined to be a psychological parent to a child, he or she stands in equal footing with the legal parent. Custody and parenting-time issues between a parent and the psychological parent are to be determined on a best-interests-of-the-child standard, giving weight to the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2–4. The Court evaluated the factors and concluded that D.G. and S.H. would share equal legal and physical custody of the child with K.S. The child would live primarily with D.G. and S.H. during the school year, with equal parenting time with K.S. on weekends, vacations, and summers.

Relocation Application Decision

In light of the Court’s decision that D.G., S.H., and K.S. would share legal and physical custody of the child, K.S.’s application to relocate the child from New Jersey to California was denied. The Court also noted the speculative nature of K.S.’s relocation plans.

The Court stopped short of deeming S.H. a legal parent. Under New Jersey’s Parentage Act, legal parentage can only be conferred upon a party by “genetic contribution, gestational primacy, or adoption.” T he Court found that S.H. was not a gestational carrier, not biologically related to the child, and did not seek a formal adoption of the child.

Thus, the Court did not find that S.H. was a legal parent.

This ruling illustrates how our Courts are presented with new issues as societal norms continue to evolve.

If you have questions about relocation or non-traditional parenting time arrangements, it is imperative that you discuss your questions with an experienced matrimonial attorney.



from New Jersey Law Blog http://ift.tt/2xLweVG
via IFTTT

Monday, September 4, 2017

How Do the Charges for Heroin Possession and Intent to Sell Differ?

If you are involved in a heroin-related crime, the charges you will face will largely depend upon whether you are charged with possession of heroin or intent to sell. Knowing the difference between these two charges can potentially mean the difference between years of jail time and thousands of dollars in fines. In addition to turning to Simon Law Group for hiring a criminal lawyer in the Somerville area, we also seek to provide education on various legal topics. Here is what you need to know about the differences between heroin possession and intent to sell.