Wednesday, May 8, 2019

The Appellate Division Redresses a “Train Wreck”

Zahl v. Eastland, 2019 WL _______ (App. Div. May 8, 2019). [Disclosure: I argued this appeal for the successful defendants-appellants, having come into the case after the Law Division entered judgment against defendants]. This was a legal malpractice case in which the Law Division entered a default judgment against defendants of over $1,057,000. Defendants appealed, […]

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The Futility of Parent Coordination When a Parent Coordinator Won’t Be Decisive

I have written many times over the years regarding parent coordination, both during and after the end of the Supreme Court pilot program.  A parent coordinator is a person, sometimes a mental health professional and sometimes a lawyer, that is appointed to assist parties in high conflict custody disputes.  The description and function of a parenting coordinator under the pilot program were as follows:

A Parenting Coordinator is a qualified neutral person appointed by the court, or agreed to by the parties, to facilitate the resolution of day to day parenting issues that frequently arise within the context of family life when parents are separated. The court may appoint a Parenting Coordinator at any time during a case involving minor children after a parenting plan has been established when the parties cannot resolve these issues on their own.

The Parenting Coordinator’s goal is to aid parties in monitoring the existing parenting plan, reducing misunderstandings, clarifying priorities, exploring possibilities for compromise and developing methods of communication that promote collaboration in parenting. The Parenting Coordinator’s role is to facilitate decision making between the parties or make such recommendations, as may be appropriate, when the parties are unable to do so. One primary goal of the Parenting Coordinator is to empower parents to develop and utilize effective parenting skills so that they can resume the parenting and decision-making role without the need for outside intervention. The Parenting Coordinator should provide guidance and direction to the parties with the primary focus on the best interests of the child by reducing conflict and fostering sound decisions that aid positive child development.

The goals are laudatory and make sense.  That said, they often didn’t work because the intransigent party would not follow the parent coordinator’s recommendations.  In these circumstances, if the court order required the parties to bring parenting issues to a parent coordinator first before coming to court, and one party wasn’t going to follow the recommendation, the result was often a several month delay until something got decided by a court.  Separately, the problem parent, assuming one was worse than the other, would present any issue, every issue to the parent coordinator, using the process as a way to abuse the other parent.  This sometimes could be dealt with with a fee shifting provision, but again, if the party didn’t comply with the fee shifting provision, then back to court the parties went anyway.

Over the last several years, I have seen parenting coordination Orders that provide that the parties must follow the parent coordinator’s recommendation, unless and until it was modified by the Court and moreover, it put the onus on the objecting party to bring the matter to court (but comply pending the decision).  Note that court’s cannot totally abdicate decision making to a PC and this is not a total abdication because there is a right to object to the Court.

That seemed like progress except when the parent coordinator refuses to enforce their recommendations.  In a recent matter, both the Court’s Order of appointment and the parenting coordinator’s own retainer agreement provided language that his recommendations were binding until modified by a court.  Except that the father would never accept or follow the recommendations, and also not go to court to set them aside)and the PC would often relent.  I have heard of another recent matter with a similar mandate that was in a Consent Order requiring that the parties follow the PC’s recommendations or file a motion within a certain number of days from the recommendation if they objected.  The objecting parent will not comply and the PC is not putting her foot down.  Not only does this empower the offending parent, but it further delays resolution and continues to victimize the parent that is in the right.

Often, the explanation is that the PC wants the parties ultimately to come to a consensus.  In most cases, however, if they were able to do that, they wouldn’t need a PC in the first place.  More importantly, the role is not mediator or therapist.  The goal is to not be even handed or Solomonic where you have one parent that is the offender the majority of the time.  If the PC cannot make the tough recommendation and stand behind it, their appointment is pointless and a waste of the parties’ resources.  Moreover, it allows the offending party to continue to use the process to harass and abuse the other party.

_________________________________________

 Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Morristown, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973) 994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

 



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Breach of Fiduciary Duty Not Dischargeable in Bankruptcy

If a party brings an action alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by a person holding a Power of Attorney, or by an Executor of the Estate, this party should be aware that this judgment may have a lasting impact should it be obtained.

In general, most civil judgments are dischargeable in bankruptcy should the judgment debtor file for bankruptcy. With regard to a breach of fiduciary duty, however, these judgments are often non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.

What that means is that the judgment cannot be discharged should the judgment debtor file for bankruptcy, but instead, will remain intact after the bankruptcy action. This fact can be used during settlement negotiations in an attempt to resolve such a lawsuit without the necessity of a Trial.

The rationale for not discharging a breach of fiduciary duty judgment is that the bankruptcy courts deem such a finding to be a “defalcation,” or improper conduct, which is not a dischargeable debt. The case law is clear on this issue and it is not unusual that a breach of fiduciary duty judgment is discharged by a bankruptcy court. As such, a judgment for breach of fiduciary duty is strong and has long lasting effects.

Thus, if a party possesses a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a person operating under a Power of Attorney or the Executor of an Estate, it is strongly recommended that this claim be prosecuted.

As an added bonus, a party may be entitled to an award of counsel fees under such a claim as well. For these reasons, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is an important claim that should be asserted any time it is supported by the facts in the context of probate or related litigation.



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Tuesday, May 7, 2019

Charitable Immunity Sweeps Broadly to Protect Monmouth University

Green v. Monmouth University, ___ N.J. ___ (2019). In a unanimous opinion by Justice Fernandez-Vina today, the Supreme Court resolved a case that had divided the Appellate Division, as discussed here. The question involved charitable immunity for an injury sustained at a concert by country singer Martina McBride that was held at Monmouth University’s Multipurpose […]

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Can an Employer Legally Withdraw a Job Offer after It’s Been Made?

Question: Can an employer legally withdraw a prospective employee’s job offer before that particular individual actually begins working at the company?

It happens more frequently than one might think, but under a variety of different circumstances. There are many reasons why a company might rescind an offer of employment, such as: a candidate’s criminal history, failed drug test, or unsatisfactory background check results; negative references; falsification of application materials; budget cuts; cancelled or postponed projects or contracts with customers; installment of a new executive; an eleventh-hour, about-face decision change by the hiring manager; belated realization of previously unnoticed or overlooked evaluation-altering information about the candidate; unfavorable post-offer experience or interactions with the candidate; and many others.

Whereas one situation may implicate certain legal considerations, another situation may require the consideration of a completely different set of legal issues and concerns. Some of these issues are discussed in prior posts by my colleagues—e.g., pre-employment drug screenings (here) and criminal background checks (here).

The focus of this post, however, is unique in that it relates to a legal issue that potentially cuts across the entire spectrum of reasons an employer may rescind an offer of employment—to wit, the employer’s potential exposure to liability for damages suffered by the prospective employee in reliance on the employer’s unfulfilled promise of employment. In New Jersey, this is a very real risk. There are, however, some simple steps and precautions employers and employees alike can take to mitigate their respective risks, better protect their respective interests, and overall mutually benefit parties on both sides of the prospective employment relationship.

The general rule in New Jersey—and in nearly every other state—is that employment relationships are, by default, presumed to be “at-will.” This means that absent some agreement to the contrary, the employment relationship may be terminated at any time, by the employer or the employee, for any reason or no reason, with or without cause or notice, so long as the reason is not statutorily prohibited or otherwise unlawful (e.g., discrimination on the basis of the employee’s membership in a protected class or retaliation for engaging in protected whistleblowing activity).

Generally, this means that when an employer makes an offer of at-will employment, the employer is free to rescind that job offer, for any reason or no reason at all, at any time, including the period after the potential employee has accepted the offer but before he or she begins work, without legal consequence. Even in the absence of a binding contract of employment or violation of some statutory proscription, however, the at-will employment doctrine is not an absolute shield to liability.

Sometimes, withdrawing the offer of employment before the prospective employee has started work may expose the employer to liability in an action by the employee for the damages resulting from repudiation of the offer (or, if already “accepted,” termination prior to commencement of employment). In certain states, including New Jersey, a judicial exception to the at-will employment doctrine has been carved out for certain circumstances where an employer rescinds an offer of employment after the prospective employee has relied on that offer to his or her detriment, such as by leaving another job or moving.

In contrast, courts in other jurisdictions, like New York, have rejected such a claim as a matter of law, declining to make a distinction between the time period before and after at-will employment begins.

A cause of action for promissory estoppel is well-recognized under New Jersey law in the context of at-will employment generally and, in particular, arising from the revocation of an employment offer. New Jersey courts have applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to such circumstances—where a prospective employee has left another job, moved, or otherwise incurred expense in reliance on an offer of at-will employment which the employer later rescinded or withdrew. See, e.g., Peck v. Imedia, Inc., 293 N.J. Super. 151, 167-68 (App. Div. 1996).

Depending on the facts in a particular matter, breach of a promise to hire an employee, even an “at will” employee, upon which a prospective employee relies, may give rise to an award of damages for breach of that promise under this doctrine. Id. at 162, 167. Thus, in Peck, the New Jersey Appellate Division held that even when a job is terminable at will, a promissory estoppel claim can arise from rescission or revocation of a job offer “where there is denial of a good faith opportunity to perform after a prospective employee has resigned from an existing position in reliance upon a firm job offer.” Id. at 167-68; see also Bonczek v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 304 N.J. Super. 593, 599 (App. Div. 1997) (same).

To recover against a former prospective employer on a theory of promissory estoppel in the job offer rescission context, the spurned employee must prove: (1) there was a clear and definite promise of employment by the employer; (2) the employer made the promise with the expectation the employee would rely upon it; (3) the employee reasonably did rely on the promise; and (4) he or she incurred a definite and substantial detriment as a result of such reliance. See Peck, 293 N.J. Super. at 165.

Although the factual nuances can vary greatly from one case to the next, at a basic level a typical scenario supporting such a claim may look something like this:

After several rounds of interviews and lengthy negotiations regarding the position, salary, relocation, and other details, a New Jersey employee (“Employee”) is offered a management position with a Fortune 500 company at the company’s headquarters in California. One of the company’s hiring partners conveys the offer to Employee over the phone and mails a written offer letter detailing the position being offered, title, benefits, salary, location, supervisor, start date, a summary of the onboarding process, and other information. Employee accepts and mails back the signed offer letter.

Prior to Employee’s scheduled start date, the hiring partner encourages Employee to put his New Jersey home on the market, purchase a new home for him and his family near the company’s corporate headquarters in California, make the necessary arrangements for the move, and give his New Jersey employer notice of his resignation. Employee does all of this only to receive a call one week before his scheduled start date at the new company rescinding the offer. At that point, Employee contacts his boss from his then-former employer in New Jersey with the hope of retaining or getting back his job, but it is too late as the position has already been filled and there are no other openings. Meanwhile, Employee has incurred tens of thousands of dollars in out-of-pocket expenses preparing for the cross-country move that is no longer happening.

Fast-forward six months, and Employee finally has managed to re-sell the property previously purchased in California at only a moderate loss, but still is not able to secure a new job until after another four months go by.

In the above scenario, if the employee did everything he was supposed to do and had no blemishes on his record, and if the hiring partner induced the employee to resign from gainful employment and sell his home while purchasing a new one in California, the availability of the promissory estoppel doctrine under such circumstances serves its essential purpose: to avoid the substantial hardship or injustice which would result if such a promise were not enforced.

When these situations arise, they can be a crushing blow financially (especially with the likely unavailability of unemployment benefits). The promissory estoppel doctrine tempers those harsh consequences by placing the aggrieved former employee or candidate back in the same position he or she would have been in had the relied-upon offer of employment never been made in the first place.

Thus, assuming Employee’s reliance was reasonable and intended, Employee could recover damages consisting of lost earnings he would have received from his former employer had he not detrimentally relied on the promise, as well as the amounts spent for moving expenses and possibly money lost from selling real property at a loss.

There will always be times where employers want or may be legally required to withdraw previously conveyed offers of employment. Knowing that, what can employers do to best insulate themselves from these kinds of claims? While employers throughout the State should review their current hiring practices, policies and procedures, and work with experienced employment counsel to confirm these processes and update and revise them as needed, here are three starting points:

First, employers should be clear with candidates about any pre-employment screenings and other conditions precedent to actual employment that must be satisfied. If an offer is conditional, that should be clearly conveyed to the candidate. This will strengthen the company’s defenses against potential job offer rescission claims brought by job applicants whose offers were withdrawn due to their failure to satisfy stated contingencies.

Second, when a conditional offer of employment is being made, the offer letter should clearly state that the prospective employee should not give notice of his or her resignation to his or her then present employer until he or she receives written confirmation that he or she has successfully satisfied all preconditions of employment.

In furtherance of this point, employers should implement appropriate policies and procedures to ensure that everyone involved in the employment process understands and abides by that same directive. No matter how clear an employer’s offer letters and other employment forms are, all it takes is one person from the employer to indicate prematurely that someone is safe to give his or her two weeks’ notice for that applicant to have an actionable claim if the offer of employment is subsequently withdrawn. See, e.g., Schley v. Microsoft Corp., No. 08-3589 (DRD), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96059 (D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2008) (despite clear and unambiguous language in offer letter that employment offer was conditional on successful completion of criminal background check, plaintiff had viable claim against Microsoft for revoking offer due to failure to satisfy condition where Microsoft hiring manager had pushed plaintiff to resign from previous job and search for new home across the country).

Third, offer letters should also state that the letter is neither intended nor should be considered to be a contract of employment for a definite or indefinite period of time, and that any employment offered is and solely will be employment at-will. The prospective employee or applicant should be required to sign and return an acknowledgment to this effect.

While all three of the above points are crucial to the analysis, employers should revisit their employment processes, procedures, and forms, and should work with experienced employment counsel to minimize risk in connection with the hiring process.

Whether you are an employer seeking guidance or concerned about compliance, or an employee or job applicant seeking recourse from wrongful rescission of a job offer, the labor and employment attorneys at Stark & Stark are here to help.



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Monday, May 6, 2019

The Supreme Court Takes Three More Cases

The Supreme Court announced today that it has granted review in three new cases. One of them is before the Court on leave to appeal, while the other two involve grants of certification The leave to appeal case is State v. Andrews. The question presented there, as formulated by the Supreme Court Clerk’s office, is […]

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Friday, May 3, 2019

Grandparents May Not Be Entitled To Visitation Even With A Signed Agreement

Grandparent visitation is a unique area of family law that presents interesting case law every few years and seems to be growing with time and modern families.  We have blogged about this issue, including the requirement to show harm to the child if the grandparent doesn’t have visitation and procedure for grandparent visitation applications, as well as impact of Consent Orders between parents and grandparents for visitation with the child.   The Appellate Division just released an unpublished (non-precedential) decision in a consolidated appeal that touches upon both the harm requirement for cases reviewed under the Grandparent Visitation Act, as well as issues with consent agreements for grandparent visitation: L.S. and L.V. v. F.S. and S.P.M./L.S. and L.V. v. F.S. and A.K.

The case answered two unique questions:

  1. Whether a grandparent visitation claim can be dismissed without a plenary hearing.
    • Yes. “Where a grandparent cannot make a threshold showing of harm, the complaint should be dismissed.”
  2. Whether a change in circumstances is required in order to modify the agreement between one parent and the grandparents when the agreement is not incorporated into an enforceable judgment or Court Order.
    • No. “…[G]randparent visitation agreements should be subject to a change of circumstances standard only if the agreement is incorporated  into an order or judgment and an application to the court is made for “modification of a consent order governing grandparent visitation”‘.

While those answers may seem simple, the facts of this case are nothing short of intriguing.  The plaintiffs in both matters are paternal grandma and great grandma.  The defendants in both matters are dad (F.S.) and former wife (S.P.M.), and dad (F.S.) and current wife (A.K.).  In both matters, plaintiffs sought parenting time with F.S.’ children/their grand and great grandchildren (1 child in the S.P.M. matter and 3 children in the A.K. matter, 1 of whom is A.K.’s child from another relationship who F.S. was adopting).

F.S. and S.P.M.

F.S. and S.P.M. had their daughter, Ellen, at young ages as she was born in 2011 and S.P.M. turned 18 in 2013.  Plaintiffs claim that Ellen, F.S. and S.P.M. lived with plaintiffs until they moved to a home near great grandma’s house.  However, S.P.M. claims she only lived with plaintiffs on the weekends.  Regardless, it appears undisputed that Plaintiffs brought F.S. and S.P.M. into the family business and paid the majority of their expenses.  Plaintiffs also claim that when the F.S. and S.P.M. moved into their own home, plaintiffs provided daycare services, the family had most dinners in plaintiffs’ home and Ellen spent a weekly overnight in plaintiffs’ home.  Eventually, F.S. and S.P.M. separated and got divorced.  F.S. had supervised parenting time with Ellen in plaintiffs’ home with great grandma as the selected supervisor and S.P.M. also present.  S.P.M. moved in with F.S.’ aunt and uncle and engaged in a relationship with the uncle (i.e.: grandma’s brother-in-law).  F.S. was abusing drugs (which was blamed on this relationship).  In any event, S.P.M. remained close with F.S.’ family and Ellen visited with grandma at least 3-4 days per week and they had daily telephone contact.  F.S.’ parenting time with Ellen continued at plaintiffs’ home until she was three years old.

F.S. and A.K.

Meanwhile, F.S. started a relationship with A.K.  and they lived together in plaintiffs’ home with A.K.’s child from a prior relationship.  They moved out after the birth of their first child together.  When F.S. had parenting time with Ellen, A.K. and their child, as well as A.K.’s child from another relationship, would all have dinner together with plaintiffs and the children spent overnights there. Plaintiffs continued to provide financial support to F.S. and the children.

Breakdown with Plaintiffs

It seems like every party has a different reason for the breakdown between Plaintiffs and each Defendant; however, they all agree the a significant breakdown occurred.  Plaintiffs claim that problems started in 2016, which they blame on F.S. and A.K. extorting money from plaintiffs in order to have visitation, leading to over a year of grandma not having a meaningful relationship with her grandchildren.  In her cross motion, S.P.M. claimed that problems began before then and were primarily related to plaintiffs fueling disagreements between F.S. and S.P.M., instigating child welfare complaints against S.P.M. (that did not result in any findings against S.P.M.) and exposing Ellen to screaming arguments between F.S. and plaintiffs.  At oral argument, F.S. blamed the period of no contact on an argument between F.S. and plaintiffs that then resulted in him being fired from the family business and in a homeless shelter.S.P.M. also explained that once F.S. was estranged from plaintiffs, he and S.P.M. successfully co-parented and Ellen improved in school and in her personal life.  In the year without contact, Ellen spent parenting time with F.S. on weekends and weekdays without incident.  A.K. claimed that during the year of no visitation, grandma refused to visit Ellen in their home even though other family members visited, and that the children were experiencing “peacefulness” during this no contact period.

Grandparent Visitation Agreement

Toward the end of the no contact year, plaintiffs and F.S. entered into an agreement for visitation with the children.  Neither S.P.M. nor A.K. signed the agreement or even knew about the agreement before it was signed.  F.S. thought S.P.M. and A.K. would object to the agreement had he presented it.  The agreement  did not refer to the pending divorce between A. K. and F.S., under which parenting time orders had been entered. The agreement was never entered into an enforceable Court Order or judgment.  Notwithstanding, the agreement had clear terms for regular and summer visitation with plaintiffs, exchange locations, make-up time, anti-alienation clauses and language acknowledging the children’s significant relationship with plaintiffs.

F.S. did not follow the agreement, which plaintiffs claimed was because he still tried to extort them for money in order for them to have visitation under the agreement. F.S. claims he did not cooperate because plaintiffs violated S.P.M.’s wishes, such as posting pictures of the children on social media and letting them in a pool.

Notably, at oral argument, F.S. claimed he did not participate in the drafting or understand that overnights were part of the agreement. Both mothers were opposed to plaintiffs having any contact with their children.

Close up of wooden gavel isolated on white backgroundTrial Court Decision

The trial court heard the matter in November 2017 and dismissed plaintiffs action without a plenary hearing after hearing oral argument.  Plaintiffs and S.P.M. had counsel arguing on their behalf and the court took testimony from F.S. and A.K. who did not have counsel, as well as from S.P.M. regarding lack of harm to the children by not having contact with plaintiffs.  A.K. also acknowledged that she knew about the agreement, but not until after it was signed and she objected to plaintiffs having any contact with the children.

The trial court’s decision considered both enforcement of the agreement and the grandparent visitation rights statute.

Regarding the agreement, the trial court  distinguished this matter from Slawinski v. Nicholas, noted in the above prior blog, involving a Consent Order for grandparent visitation.  However, the agreement here was merely a private agreement and it was not signed by both biological parents.  The trial court further noted that the biological mothers who object to the visitation are fit parents.  The mothers also believe that the relationship between the children’s parents would be impacted by the grandparents having visitation.  F.S. is also a fit parent and also objects to the time.

Regarding the act, plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the children would be exposed to harm without the grandparent visitation, despite the trial court’s acknowledgment of a close relationship between plaintiffs and the children.  This step is required before a court turns to the statutory factors, as explained in the above prior blogs. The trial court noted that two of the four children were infants when the agreement was signed and, thus, could not have had the “profound, substantial and enduring relationships” with plaintiffs as they had claimed; the plaintiffs were never full-time caregivers; and, the mothers were not parties to the agreement.  The trial court went on to state that even if harm was demonstrated, visitation would not be in the children’s best interests because the mothers were fit parents and it would have negatively impacted the parents’ relationship with each other.

Appellate Decision

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s holding.  The Court acknowledged the “value of a child’s relationship with his or her grandparent”.  However, superior to that value is “…the principle that parents have a fundamental right ‘to make decisions regarding the care and custody of their children'”, citing to the polestar case of Moriarty v. Bradt, also discussed in the above prior blogs.  Pursuant to Moriarty, the grandparents must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation is necessary to perform harm to the child, which the grandparents did not accomplish here.  As the Court explained while relying on case law, the statutory factors are only reviewed after this burden to prove harm is met. Thus, the court held that “Where a grandparent cannot make a threshold showing of harm, the complaint should be dismissed“, which is what happened in this matter.  They further stated that “…no evidence [was] presented by plaintiffs that established the requisite showing of particular ‘concrete harm’ to any of the children that would support a finding that plaintiffs overcame the presumption against interference with the parents’ fundamental rights” – focusing on the fact that all parents opposed the visitation and are themselves fit parents, the grandparents were never permanent caretakers of the children and they only speak of general suffering in the event of lost contact.

Regarding the agreement, the court found that it is not enforceable/doesn’t require a change in circumstances to modify.

“We concluded in Slawinski that grandparent visitation agreements should be subject to a change of circumstances standard only if the agreement is incorporated into an order or judgment and an application to the court is made for “modification of a consent order governing grandparent visitation

…

Absent a court order, a parent who agrees orally or in writing to allow grandparent visitation is free to withdraw from that agreement unless the significant harm required by the Act is established.”

Takeaway

After all of that, it’s important to remember the tough burden of proof in grandparent visitation cases before running into court.  Also, if entering into an agreement for grandparent visitation, make sure it’s filed with the Court and both biological fit parents are parties if you foresee any enforcement issues (and even if you don’t).


Lindsay A. Heller is an associate in the firm’s Family Law practice, based in its Morristown, NJ office. You can reach Lindsay at 973.548.3318 or lheller@foxrothschild.com.

Lindsay A. Heller, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP



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