Wednesday, November 27, 2019

Black Friday Shopping for… A New Attorney? Considerations for Selecting New Counsel

The holiday season is here, which means your inbox is probably flooded with e-mails about sales, promotions and must-have purchases. If you are unhappy with your current counsel and a new divorce attorney is on your shopping list this year, here are some important considerations to remember selecting new legal representation:

  1. Don’t be afraid to browse. Any seasoned consumer knows you have to shop around a bit before making a purchase. The same principle applies when picking a new attorney. Ask for referrals and then speak to several attorneys before making your decision. You will spend a significant amount of time working with your selected counsel, so it is important that it’s a good fit. A  trustworthy attorney should encourage you to explore your options before making a choice, so you are confident in your decision and feel comfortable with your new counsel.
  2. Read the reviews. Once you find someone you like, do some research! Your new attorney should have experience in handling matters similar to your own. While any lawyer can tell you they have the necessary qualifications, the right one will have examples to back it up. Reviewing their bio, LinkedIn, blog posts and articles will help you do your homework.
  3. Make a shopping list. You should identify and write down your objectives at the outset of your search. Why are you unhappy with your current counsel? Is your current lawyer too easy-going? Too aggressive? Unresponsive to your inquiries? When consulting with a potential new lawyer, explain your dissatisfaction and ask targeted questions to ensure that the switch will remedy those concerns.
  4. Don’t miss the sale. Timing is critical. Whenever an attorney takes over a case in the middle, it takes time to get up to speed. Your new attorney will need to review the file and become knowledgeable about what has happened in your case to best assist you. If you think you want to change counsel, don’t hesitate and wait until you have an upcoming trial date or other big court appearance. Unless the court will grant an extension or adjournment, the right attorney for you may not have the capacity to get on board so quickly.

Happy shopping!

 

Katherine A. Nunziata, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLPKatherine A. Nunziata is an associate in the firm’s Family Law practice, based in the Morristown, NJ office. You can reach Katherine at (973-548-3324) or at knunziata@foxrothschild.com.

 



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Tuesday, November 26, 2019

Estate vs. Non-Estate Assets

In the process of probating and administering a Last Will and Testament of a Decedent, questions may arise whether assets owned by the Decedent are considered Estate assets or non-estate assets. This is called the distinction between probate and non-probate assets. It is important for determining Estate taxes to make this distinction.

In general, probate assets are all assets which pass under the terms of the Last Will and Testament. This could include specific bequests or property, transfers of sums of money, or any other type of tangible or intangible asset that is specified to pass pursuant to the terms of the Last Will and Testament. Additionally, accounts which are titled only in the name of the Decedent without a right of survivorship, insurance policies which are similarly situated, or other investment vehicles which contain no beneficiary designation, could likewise be considered assets of the Estate which pass under the Will.

Assets which are considered non-probate are assets which pass outside of the Estate. These may be joint accounts with a right of survivorship which pass to the remaining account holder upon the death of one of the parties. Further, most residences are titled as joint tenants with the right of survivorship whereby the residence passes to the remaining surviving member upon the death of the other. Obviously, if a house is owned solely by one person than it can pass to the Estate. Other common forms of non-probate assets could be insurance policies where a specific beneficiary is named, as well as IRA’s or other investment vehicles whereby beneficiaries of the accounts are named.

When preparing an accounting for an Estate, it is important that the Executor and their counsel know whether assets are classified as probate or non-probate due to the tax consequences which may result therefrom. It is a bright line rule that if an asset is named under a Last Will and Testament and there is no beneficiary designation with regard to the asset, than it is a probate asset. On the other hand, if an asset is not named under the Will and contains a beneficiary designation on the instrument itself, than it is a non-probate asset. Obviously, there are exceptions to this process rule. For insurance, if the purported beneficiary predeceased the Decedent. Nonetheless, it is always important to determine whether an asset is probate or non-probate in the context of administrating an Estate. The attorneys at Stark & Stark are well versed in this regard and are happy to assist you.



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Monday, November 18, 2019

Appellate Division Examines Proofs Required to Establish Mental Incapacity and Lack of Consent Under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act (SASPA)

In a recent published (i.e. precedential) decision, C.R. v. M.T., the New Jersey Appellate Division elaborated upon the legal standard proving that a sexual encounter during which one party was intoxicated was non-consensual under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act (SASPA) N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -21.

Although we have blogged frequently on domestic violence restraining orders obtained under the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, SASPA offers another avenue to obtain restraining orders for victims of sexual assault.  In C.R., the plaintiff commenced an action under SASPA in order to restrain the defendant from having any contact or communication with her.  The question in dispute was not whether a sexual encounter occurred – both parties agreed that it had – but rather whether the plaintiff was capable of providing her consent for the encounter and, if so, whether she had in fact done so.

Under SASPA, the first factual hurdle that a plaintiff must overcome is proof of “the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct.” This must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning that the plaintiff must convince the finder of fact that it is more likely than not that there was a sexual encounter that was non-consensual.  Furthermore, as the trial court acknowledged, consent given out of fear and/or consent that is ultimately revoked is treated under the statute as a lack of consent.  As stated in the decision In re MTS, 129 N.J. 422, 444 (1992), “Permission to engage in sexual relations must be freely given and that willingness may be inferred from acts or statements reasonably viewed in light of the circumstances.”

The second prong that the plaintiff must establish in order to obtain a restraining order is that such protection is needed due to “the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim.”

The Appellate Division decision addresses the first prong, namely the question of adequate proof that the sexual encounter was non-consensual. One way in which the statute permits a lack of consent to be established is via temporary mental incapacity, which can be generated by the victim’s intoxication. In this case, the plaintiff argued that she was so intoxicated from drinking alcohol that she temporarily lacked the capacity to provide her consent to the sexual encounter.  The trial judge agreed.

The Appellate Division described this issue as having two components.  First, whether the plaintiff expressed or conveyed her consent to engage in the encounter and, second, whether, if not, she was too intoxicated to be capable of consent.  The trial judge correctly found that both parties presented versions of events from the encounter in question that were equally plausible.  On the plaintiff’s side, she testified that her original consent was provided only out of fear and that, eventually, she revoked it.  She further argued that, regardless, she was not capable of providing consent because she was temporarily mentally incapacitated.  It is that terminology that the Appellate Division focused on in its analysis.

SASPA defines a sexual assault victim as “one who the actor knew or should have known” was, among other things, “mentally incapacitated” at the time of the encounter.  The statute defines mental incapacitation as:

that condition in which a person is rendered temporarily incapable of understanding or controlling his conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, intoxicant, or other substance administered to that person without his prior knowledge or consent . . . .  N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(i).

The Appellate Division interpreted this statute as saying that a victim may prove the lack of consent a mental incapacity brought on by either voluntary or involuntary intoxication.  Put another way, whether the victim voluntarily drank to the point of intoxication (which, in this case, it was not disputed that she did this) or was involuntarily intoxicated (i.e. forced to become intoxicated or given something which would cause intoxication without her knowledge) is of no moment.

The Appellate Division next considered the level of intoxication necessary to establish mental incapacity, or an inability to consent.  The Appellate Division found that in order to establish this, “[a]n alleged SASPA victim must prove intoxication to such a degree that her faculties were prostrated to the point of being incapable of consenting to the sexual encounter,” which may be established by a preponderance of the evidence.

Undoubtedly, the Appellate Divisions’ examination of these issues provides some important clarification.  However, when considering the required proofs, it is all too clear that in many cases, the ability to establish these facts by a preponderance of the evidence will often  come down to the comparative credibility of the parties and their respective versions of events, as it did in this case where the trial judge believed both parties’ recitations of the events of the night in question to be “equally plausible.”


headshot_diamond_jessicaJessica C. Diamond is an associate in the firm’s Family Law Practice, resident in the Morristown, NJ, office. You can reach Jessica at (973) 994.7517 or jdiamond@foxrothschild.com.



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Friday, November 15, 2019

Houlihan’s Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy; Rival, Landry’s LLC is Stalking Horse Bidder

HRI Holding Corp, aka the Houlihan’s restaurant chain, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Delaware under docket number 19-12415 on Thursday, November 14, 2019.

The Debtor owns 47 restaurants in 14 states, under Houlihan’s, Houlihan’s Restaurant + Bar, Bristol Seafood Grill, J. Gilbert’s Wood-Fired Grill, and Devon Seafood Grill restaurants.

HRI Holding Corp owns 100% of Houlihan’s Restaurants Inc., but there are 39 separate entities, 93.4% owned by affiliates of York Capital Management.

The Debtor has an asset purchase agreement with Landry’s for a stalking horse bid for most of the assets.

If you have a Houlihan’s, Houlihan’s Restaurant + Bar, Bristol Seafood Grill, J. Gilbert’s Wood-Fired Grill, and/or Devon Seafood Grill lease in your portfolio, Stark & Stark’s Shopping Center & Retail Development Group can help.

Our bankruptcy attorneys regularly represent landlords throughout the country, including recently in the Eastern District of Missouri, District of New Jersey, Southern District of New York, District of Delaware, District of Minnesota, and the Western and Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania regarding a variety of issues.

Our Group has been counsel to landlords and trade creditors in the Mattress Firm, Toys “R” Us, Payless, Eastern Outfitters (EMS Part 2), EMS, Golfsmith, RadioShack, General Wireless (RadioShack 2), Gander Mountain, A&P, Joyce Leslie, rue21, Central Grocers, and Sports Authority chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.

For more information on how Stark & Stark can assist you, please contact Thomas Onder, Shareholder, at (609) 219-7458 or tonder@stark-stark.com or Joseph Lemkin at (609) 791-7022 or jlemkin@stark-stark.com.



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What Happens to Your Home During a Divorce

Deciding what to do with a marital home during a divorce can be tricky. Sometimes one or both parties wishes to retain the house after the divorce by buying the other spouse out of their interest. Other times, the parties may choose to sell the home either during the divorce or after the divorce is finalized.

There are financial and personal benefits to selling the marital house in the midst of the divorce process. The profits gained from the sale of the home might provide each spouse with the means to start anew post-divorce. It can also provide closure both legally and emotionally. Couples often choose to sell their home during a divorce because their financial circumstances may prohibit them from simultaneously maintaining the costs of the marital home and one or more separate residences.

In some cases, the disposition of a home in equitable distribution is the simplest issue to address. The home is either sold, with the proceeds divided between the parties, or one party quickly refinances the mortgage and buys out the other party’s interest.

Sometimes, it isn’t so easy. What happens if both parties want to keep the home post-divorce? What happens if neither party can afford to keep the home by themselves, but the property’s value is less than the mortgage on the property and can’t be sold without both parties walking away with excess debt from the mortgage(s)? Are there children involved, and is it important to keep them in the home, perhaps to keep them in the same school or district? Are one or both parties’ credit rating an impediment to refinancing? Is the property in foreclosure or behind in payments?

The answers to these questions and more can determine what may happen to your home and whether you can retain it following the finalization of your divorce. Equitable distribution of any asset, your home included, depends on the particular circumstances in yours and your spouse’s life.

If you have any questions about how to retain or dispose of your marital home during a divorce, or any other issues related to a divorce, please feel free to reach out to the author, Louis Ragone, Esquire.



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Monday, November 11, 2019

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals Hit Penneast Pipeline Company with Another Setback

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals hit PennEast Pipeline Company with another setback on November 5, 2019. The Court of Appeals denied the company’s request for a rehearing of the Court’s earlier decision, which held that the 11th Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits PennEast Pipeline Company from suing the State of New Jersey in Federal Court. A copy of the Order can be found here.

So, where does PennEast go from here? We hope home, but that is unlikely.

PennEast can ask the United States Supreme Court to review the decision, however, appeals to the United States Supreme Court are not automatic and an appealing party must file a petition and ask the Court to accept the case for review. The United States Supreme Court only agrees to review about 1% to 2% of the cases where parties seek a review by the high court.

Stay tuned for the next step in the saga of PennEast versus New Jersey and its residents. PennEast is not going away, but either are the people fighting the good fight!



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Solving The Puzzle Now Will Hopefully Make For A Less Litigious Future

One of the hardest lessons I learned in my early days of practicing family law is that a case is never really over when we think it’s over.  I remember walking out of my first uncontested hearing so proud that I helped finalize a client’s divorce, emotional for their loss (yes, it happened to be a case where each party cried and hugged) and hopeful for their future.  I still have those feelings but, over time (and it didn’t take long), have become less blinded by the proverbial success of “putting through” a divorce because it’s never really over, especially when children are involved.  Instead of focusing on getting across the finish line sooner rather than later, the focus shifts to preparing agreements that will hopefully enable the parties to have their uncontested hearing as the last piece of the puzzle, and not the start of a new jigsaw.  Admittedly, this is not always easy.  Sometimes in that 3rd, 4th, 5th mediation session, when it’s 8:00 at night,  stomachs are rumbling and the caffeine is wearing off, and agreements are complete but for certain issues that seem minor at the time, it’s hard for clients to walk away without a signed writing just because of an ancillary thought that, in the moment, may seem resolvable down the road.  What if the parties are amicable and you are trying to convince a client to open up an issue that he/she may not want to address with their spouse because they know it’s a trigger and doubt they will ever become acrimonious down the road?  However, the price to pay in the days, months or years to come is worth the extra time to resolve issues now to the extent that they are ready for resolution.  But, as hard as we try, we have all been there!

In a recent unpublished (non-precedential) decision Soler v. Stark,  the issue at first glance appears to be the children’s religious upbringing when each parent observes a different faith.  However, when reading between the lines, the crux of the case is really the importance of comprehensive settlement agreements without leaving ripe issues for future resolution down the road.  Put another way, it seems apparent that a difficult, and possibly impossible to resolve issue was kicked down the road, even though it was foreseeable that future litigation would ensue.

In Soler, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement, with an incorporated custody parenting time agreement.   Plaintiff was designated as the parent of primary residence for school enrollment only.  The parties explicitly agreed to share equal decision making rights regarding all integral decisions for their children.  The parties acknowledged in their agreements that they each have different religious and cultural backgrounds (plaintiff/mom is Catholic and defendant/dad is Jewish).  They  agreed to later submit to mediation any unresolved issues regarding the cultural and religious upbringing of their children.  It seems that they did allocate parenting time for holidays of both religions because, as relevant to this decision, Defendant had parenting time for Easter Break every year but Plaintiff had parenting time on Easter so long as Defendant was not traveling with their children.  All seems standard and not unlike many agreements that I have reviewed/drafted.  So, what comes next?  The parties disagree about their children’s religious upbringing.

In 2018, Defendant filed an application seeking to complete their youngest child’s conversion to Judaism, to enroll the twins in Hebrew School and also enroll their youngest child at the relevant age, as well as to compel Plaintiff to bring their children to Hebrew School during her parenting time and restrain her from making derogatory comments about the religion to their children.  In opposition, Plaintiff sought to have their children exposed to both religions/cultures and for Easter Sunday parenting time every year.  The trial court heard oral argument but did not require a hearing.  Briefly, in support of his application, Defendant certified that Plaintiff took classes in Judaism before their marriage, that they agreed to raise their children in the Jewish faith and that their son was circumcised in a Jewish ceremony but his conversion was not complete.  In opposition, Plaintiff certified that she went to the class to support her then soon-to-be husband, that she never agreed to raise their children in the Jewish faith/send them to Hebrew School and only partook in certain rituals during their marriage due to Plaintiff’s pressure to do so, as well as claimed that Defendant wrongfully withheld Easter parenting time from her in 2018 when he brought their children to a local amusement park.

Ultimately, the trial court determined that their youngest child would complete his conversion to Judaism, that Defendant may bring their children to Hebrew School during his parenting time but that Plaintiff need not do so during her parenting time, and granted Plaintiff’s request for Easter Sunday parenting time every year commencing in 2020, as well as permitted her to educate their children with her religious and moral values.  This appeal followed.

The Appellate Division ultimately held that (1)  Each party was free to raise their children in their own religious beliefs during his/her parenting time; thus, the trial court’s decision allowing Plaintiff to do so was affirmed; and, (2) The trial court improperly modified Easter parenting time with a showing of changed circumstances and the court did not conduct a hearing to determine if the modification was in their children’s best interests; thus, the modified Easter parenting time schedule was reversed.  The Appellate Division noted that Plaintiff may be entitled to compensatory parenting time for her loss of Easter parenting time, but even if Defendant violated the schedule, one violation does not equate to changed circumstances warranting a modification to their parenting time schedule.

Notably, the Appellate Division reviewed case law regarding superior rights bestowed upon primary/custodial parents to make decisions on behalf of their children, which was not relevant here given the language of Plaintiff’s designation being for school enrollment only, as well as case law regarding disputes for religious upbringing and each party’s constitutional right to religious freedom.  This was all required because the contractual agreement lacked a decision with respect to their children’s religious upbringing.  The Appellate Division also reviewed the parties’ conflicting certifications but could not determine whether they had an agreement to raise their children in the Jewish faith because the trial court did not conduct a plenary hearing.  Of note, had the court done so, each party would have spent a substantial amount of time and money litigating this issue that was held in abeyance.

While the case law history is interesting, and I recommend a read to brush up on who gets to determine a child’s religion, the puzzle is really solved by addressing all relevant issues to the extent we can at the time the agreement is finalized.  This also enables you to be the person who chooses the outcome, rather than asking the trial court or Appellate Division to determine material child-rearing issues on behalf of your family.


Lindsay A. Heller is an associate in the firm’s Family Law practice, based in its Morristown, NJ office. You can reach Lindsay at 973.548.3318 or lheller@foxrothschild.com.

Lindsay A. Heller, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP



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Friday, November 8, 2019

Sears Wants It’s Money Back… Debtor Filing Preference Complaints Against Trade Creditors

This past week, Chapter 11 debtor Sears Holdings Corporation (“Sears”) filed hundreds of preference complaints to recover money from paid pre-petition creditors.

For most creditors, it must seem odd to be receiving a complaint to return money for goods or services sold prior to October 15, 2018 (the date when Sears filed for bankruptcy protection). However, the practice of recovering “preferences” in bankruptcy is allowed by federal statute – 11 U.S.C. 547. Before you go a writing a check to Sears, know what defenses you have against this statutory claim.

What is “Preference”?

A “preference” is a payment received from a debtor, made within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing.  Bankruptcy Code section 547(b) allows a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession to avoid these payments, if the transfers were to, or for, the benefit of a creditor on account of an antecedent debt while the debtor was insolvent. When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, “preferences” were meant to level the playing field for all creditors by preventing a creditor from receiving more money than it would have within the debtor’s bankruptcy case.

The Bankruptcy Code provides the trustee or debtor-in-possession the power to recover these transfers. However, you may have certain defenses, including: payments made within the ordinary course of business; new value provided for the debt; payments made outside of the 90-day preference period; settlements during the bankruptcy case; and/or payments made via C.O.D.

Gather Information From Your Client

To determine if you have any defenses, it is critical that you analyze the full payment history at least one year before the bankruptcy filing. This information includes:

  1. All correspondence, contracts, emails, and the like with the debtor
  2. A copy of all invoices showing invoice date, terms, and amount of each invoice;
  3. A copy of the payments received (i.e. checks, wires, cash deposit slip) and date posted to your client’s bank account;
  4. The number of days elapsed between the invoice date and the date payment was received; and
  5. Personnel involved with the debtor’s account so they can advise how payments were made, applied and any unique issues with the debtor.

 

It is critical to properly analyze this information and formulate a corresponding response to reduce or even eliminate preference exposure.

If you received a preference complaint and/or demand, Stark & Stark’s Shopping Center & Retail Development Group can help.

Our bankruptcy attorneys regularly represent landlords throughout the country, including recently in the Eastern District of Missouri, District of New Jersey, Southern District of New York, District of Delaware, District of Minnesota, and the Western and Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania regarding a variety of issues.

Our Group has been counsel to landlords and trade creditors in the Mattress Firm, Toys “R” Us, Payless, Eastern Outfitters (EMS Part 2), EMS, Golfsmith, RadioShack, General Wireless (RadioShack 2), Gander Mountain, A&P, Joyce Leslie, rue21, Central Grocers, and Sports Authority chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.

For more information on how Stark & Stark can assist you, please contact Thomas Onder, Shareholder, at (609) 219-7458 or tonder@stark-stark.com or Joseph Lemkin at (609) 791-7022 or jlemkin@stark-stark.com.



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