Friday, May 31, 2019

A Cautionary Tale: What You Say in a Certification May Not Be in Your Children’s Best Interests, or Yours

A short time ago I had a conversation with a lawyer who had been the subject of a custody battle between her parents more than thirty years ago. Later in life, she decided to satisfy her curiosity of what her parents had said to the court, and obtained copies of all the pleadings they filed. In New Jersey, as in many states, very few documents are sealed or confidential, allowing this woman to access all of the certifications, or affidavits, her parents filed.

With an Ivy League education, this attorney certainly understood the litigation process and the heightened emotions it triggers. She said reading what her parents said about each other changed her relationship with them forever, even all those years later. While she knew they were fighting over her, she did not know at the time what was being presented to the judge, and she had had a lingering curiosity.

So often, parents who are seeking custody of children are clouded by the process and the swirling emotions that are pervasive in a divorce, or custody battle. They are angry, hurt, and in many cases, frightened about not having control over the future. In all but the smallest number of cases, lifestyles and dreams are about to drastically change. The relationship with the children may be the only thing that a parent thinks can be maintained. However, even that relationship has to change when the two parents start living apart.

In most cases, the children love both parents and want to have a good relationship with both. Also, in most cases, the children have two good parents who both deserve to have an active role in raising the children. Their lives are also changing drastically, which is frightening, and they don’t need to find out all of the terrible things that one parent thought about the other.

It is so easy to say, post on social media, or write in a court pleading terrible things about the other parties’ parenting style that may not be truly accurate. Just because the other parent has done terrible things to his or her partner does not mean that he or she is a bad parent. Also, just because the other parent’s parenting style may differ from your own, doesn’t mean your opinion should be broadcast in a public forum.

When custody and parenting time are in dispute, your lawyer can guide you to resolve those issues prior to resorting to the public arena of the court system.



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Court Declares Right to Obtain Counsel in Domestic Violence Cases

On May 9, 2019, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court ruled that defendants in domestic violence cases must be informed of the right to obtain counsel and of the serious consequences that could result from the entry of a Final Restraining Order (FRO).

In B.P. v. R.P.  the appellate court reaffirmed its previous caution that an FRO “is not merely an injunction entered in favor of one private citizen against another” but has “serious consequences to the personal and professional lives of those who are found guilty of what the Legislature has characterized as a serious crime against society.” Consequences can include fingerprinting and entry in a central registry of offenders, as well as potential imprisonment for violations of an FRO.

Based on the above, the Court determined that the right to seek counsel is “an important due process right” to domestic violence defendants.

The decision did not go so far as to say that a defendant has a right to appointed court-counsel, but rather “the reasonable opportunity to retain an attorney.” In this case, the trial judge had failed to inform the defendant of the “serious consequences” if found guilty, or conduct any exploration of the defendant’s right to an attorney. As a result, the FRO was vacated and the case remanded for a new hearing.

The New Jersey Legislature having declared that domestic violence is a “crime against society,” the Court was properly mindful of its responsibility toward the administration of justice. While some observers may contend that the ruling should have included a right to court-appointed counsel, this argument is left for another day.



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Thursday, May 30, 2019

The Anniversary of Packard-Bamberger v. Collier

On May 30, 2001, the Supreme Court decided Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001). Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Verniero held that a corporate director who had also acted as counsel to the corporation could be liable for an award of attorneys’ fees in an attorney misconduct action against him by […]

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NJ Continues to Restrict Craft Breweries – Limits on Special Events, Food, & More

On May 28, 2019, the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (“ABC”) issued a new Special Ruling for New Jersey craft brewery licenses with changes that address concerns raised by the industry. The previous Special Ruling, which was quickly suspended six months ago after strong criticism, is now officially rescinded.

The ABC drafted the new Special Ruling after consulting with some industry leaders and other interested parties. Like the previous ruling, it aims to restrict NJ limited breweries from competing with bars and restaurants who hold licenses allowing full retail privileges. The changes in the new ruling, however, reflect key issues raised by breweries about their ability to promote and build their businesses.

Some notable changes in the new Special Ruling include:

  • Limited breweries can once again provide patrons with menus to local restaurants and have food delivered, which was banned under the previous special ruling. Providing food or collaborating with vendors, including food trucks, continues to be prohibited.
  • Breweries are still capped at hosting no more than 25 “special events” per year, however, the changes now define “special events” as only those promoted through the media or which provide entertainment with live music performances or broadcasts of live championship sporting events. With this change, trivia nights, paint-and-sips, and other activities that previously were categorized as “special events,” are no longer limited.
  • Private parties remain limited to 52 events per year, but party hosts are now permitted to bring their own wine and beer to their events, allowing breweries to better market themselves as venues.
  • The requirement for breweries to give a tour of their facilities to each customer is now more lenient. Tours were previously required for each visit, but repeat customers now only have to tour once a year as long as the brewery keeps a log of tour participation.
  • Limited breweries can now obtain permits to participate in 12 off-premises events each year. This will allow them to sell beer at community events and other venues that were previously restricted.

The New Jersey ABC intends to convert the special ruling into regulations that will be adopted in accordance with the formal notice and comment process. In the meantime, the special ruling will be imposed as special conditions on all licensees during the 2020-2021 term.

New Jersey notably continues its efforts to restrict craft breweries, especially compared to neighboring states. Pennsylvania is helping expand its craft beer industry, and now permits craft breweries to sell Pennsylvania-made liquor and wine. The creation of a Pennsylvania Malt and Brewed Beverages Industry Promotion Board recently authorized the approval of up to $1 million annually in grants for the development and marketing of the PA beer industry.

Stark & Stark’s Beer & Spirits lawyers are experienced in advocating for breweries in New Jersey before the ABC and other regulatory bodies. If you are an interested party that would like to provide comments during the formal rule adoption process and would like assistance from our Beer & Spirits lawyers, please reach out to Marshall Kizner or Dolores Kelley.



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Wednesday, May 29, 2019

Faxes That Are Not “Advertisements” Do Not Violate The Telephone Consumer Protection Act Even if Sent for a Commercial Purpose or Motivated by Profit

Mauthe, M.D., P.C. v. Optum Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 2019). Plaintiff, a medical practice, received an unsolicited fax from defendants. Defendants maintain a database of healthcare providers, a database that they sell to various entities. To keep the database current, defendants send unsolicited faxes to listed providers, asking them to respond and correct […]

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Tuesday, May 28, 2019

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is Subject to New Jersey Arbitration Statutes

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey v. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Benevolent Ass’n, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2019). Today’s decision by Judge Gibbons Whipple focuses on the question of “whether the Port Authority, as a bi-state public corporate instrumentality, is subject to New Jersey […]

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An Unusual U.S. Supreme Court Lineup Rules Against Class Action Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants on a Removal Issue

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, ___ U.S. ___ (2019). Among other changes made by the so-called Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 1453(b) (“CAFA”) made it easier for class action defendants to remove to federal court putative class action cases filed in state courts. That provision states that a class action may […]

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Friday, May 24, 2019

New Personal Electronic Device Policy Affecting the James A. Byrne U.S. Courthouse

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has promulgated a new policy regarding cameras and personal electronic devices for all of its courthouses. The new policy, which is embodied in a standing order that is available here, goes into effect on June 3, 2019. Because the Byrne Courthouse, where the Third Circuit sits, is covered by this […]

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Thursday, May 23, 2019

Domestic Violence Defendants Require Opportunity To Prepare Defense Even When FRO Is Warranted For Another Predicate Act

I have now blogged a few times about the importance for due process in domestic violence matters.  The Appellate Division just gave us another unpublished case, B.L.F. v. T.G.C., to remind litigants and practitioners that the plaintiff in a domestic violence action is limited to the four corners of the Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and, if the TRO is amended or the plaintiff testifies about incidents outside of those four corners,  the defendant must be given the option to have more time to prepare their defense.  Interestingly, B.L.F. reiterates this requirement even where the Appellate Division affirmed the Final Restraining Order (“FRO”) based on a predicate act that was unrelated to the testimony outside of the TRO,  but reversed the findings of additional predicate acts that may have been impacted by such testimony.  Thus, the net result does not materially impact the defendant because the FRO stands without question.

In B.L.F., a physical altercation occurred in the parking lot of Plaintiff’s gym where Defendant appeared unannounced. Neither party disputes that Plaintiff was in her car and Defendant’s arm was in the car window.  Plaintiff testified that she tried to roll up her car window after telling Defendant she didn’t want to speak to him, Defendant pushed the window down, they screamed at each other, Plaintiff began to back up and then Defendant grabbed her arm leaving bruises on her arm of which she had pictures admitted into evidence.  Defendant testified that Plaintiff rolled up the window while Defendant tried to get his arm out and then she released the window (by a centimeter), he got his arm out and fell to the ground.  The trial court found Plaintiff credible and that Defendant’s version of the incident “defied logic”.  The trial court entered an FRO against Defendant based on the predicate act of assault related to this incident, as well as on harassment and stalking based on other incidents of Defendant appearing unannounced at plaintiff’s home and restaurants – two of which were not included within the TRO.

The Appellate Division stated:

We conclude that it was improper for the trial court to consider testimony concerning these two additional episodes without asking the defendant whether he needed time to prepare a response to those new allegations. It is not clear on this record whether and to what extent plaintiff’s testimony concerning these additional incidents may have affected the trial’s court’s conclusions with respect to the harassment and stalking predicate offenses. It is clear, however, that plaintiff’s testimony about these two additional incidents would have no effect on the trial court’s findings with respect to the assault predicate offense and the need for a FRO based on that assault.

 

The Appellate Division reiterated a trial court’s duty to pose questions from the bench when one or both litigants are self-represented, but that those questions must be designed to elicit testimony about allegations within the TRO, understanding that testimony may lead to the revelation of other events, as provided by J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458 (2011).  Like contemplated in J.D., the trial court in B.L.F. asked questions of Plaintiff.  However, the issue arose by the trial court asking: “Were there other places and times when the defendant appeared without notice?”, which elicited testimony outside of the TRO and was followed up with: “”Do you have any additional testimony for the Court to consider that you’ve not already provided?”, again eliciting testimony outside of the complaint.  While the Appellate Division did not find fault in the questions themselves, the trial court did not explicitly give Defendant the opportunity to request an adjournment after Plaintiff testified about incidents beyond those listed in the TRO.

Notably, the Appellate Division found in favor of Defendant on this limited issue even though (1) Defendant may have known about his right to request an adjournment because earlier that day Plaintiff amended her TRO and Defendant chose to proceed after the trial court asked him if he was prepared to respond to the new allegations, (2) he didn’t object to the questions and (3) his testimony included a response to one of the two new incidents that Plaintiff testified about.  Reading into this, the Appellate Division opined that Defendant may not have been prepared to defend against both new incidents since he only testified about one.

The Appellate Division also found that the testimony outside of the TRO may have impacted the stalking and harassment findings because the trial court discussed it in the oral decision.  However, the Appellate Division specifically opined that the additional incidents did not impact the assault finding because they were unrelated.

Finding the predicate act is only the first step of a FRO hearing.  We then look to Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006) to determine whether an FRO is necessary to protect the victim.  The need for protection is presumed when the underlying act is of physical violence.  Therefore, the Appellate Division found that the testimony outside the TRO did not impact the trial court’s Silver analysis as it relates to assault.

B.F.M. emphasizes the need to specifically ensure on the record that the defendant in a domestic violence matter is prepared to proceed whenever a TRO is amended or testimony is given outside the four corners of the TRO – even when the defendant was made aware of this right earlier in the same day but for another matter, when the defendant touched upon some of the new testimony within his/her own testimony and when the plaintiff is entitled to an FRO for other predicate acts.


Lindsay A. Heller is an associate in the firm’s Family Law practice, based in its Morristown, NJ office. You can reach Lindsay at 973.548.3318 or lheller@foxrothschild.com.

Lindsay A. Heller, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP



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Mental Illness in Family Law & Divorce

According to the National Institute of Mental Health,

  • Approximately 1 in 5 adults in the U.S. (46.6 million) experiences mental illness in a given year. 
  • Approximately 1 in 25 adults in the U.S. (11.2 million) experiences a serious mental illness in a given year that substantially interferes with or limits one or more major life activities.
  • Approximately 1 in 5 youth aged 13–18 (21.4%) experiences a severe mental disorder at some point during their life. For children aged 8–15, the estimate is 13%.

Not surprisingly, mental health issues come up in the context of a divorce in a variety of ways. They arise when mental health issues contribute to the breakdown of the marriage or relationship. For instance, a partner may suffer from a condition which causes him or her to behave in ways that are detrimental to the relationship. This can manifest itself in aggression, narcissism, and self-centered behavior to the detriment of the other partner or children, excessive spending impacting family finances, to engaging in dangerous behavior with a partner, and/or their children.

What happens when someone believes that their partner’s actions are caused by a mental illness? After a complaint for divorce has been filed, or other court process started, attention needs to be focused to the behavior, and steps should be taken to:

  1. Ensure that children are safe;
  2. Assets of the marriage are protected; and
  3. A plan is created to provide treatment options if children are involved.

If a spouse or partner is suffering from mental illness to the extent that he or she cannot make rational decisions, the court has a variety of options to protect that person, both personally and his or her property. The court can appoint a guardian for the person, particularly if the illness is so extreme as to cause a person to be incompetent.

If the litigant is ill, but not to the point of incompetency, the court can appoint a Guardian Ad Litem.

If a partner or spouse’s illness is creating a risk of assets being dissipated, a court can freeze accounts, and limit access to funds. A court may allow a third party to make payments on behalf of a litigant such as rent, etc.

There is little question that difficult issues arise when a parent suffers from mental illness. The courts, acting in the best interests of children, must make sure the child is safe, while at the same time safeguarding a parent’s rights to have a relationship with a child. When custody is an issue and one parent is alleging that the other suffers from a mental illness, the court will typically order an evaluation by a licensed mental health provider with experience in custody cases. The court may enter an order limiting, or prohibiting contact with the children pending the outcome of the evaluation. Then, depending on the outcome of the evaluation, the court may order therapy, medication, or other recommended treatment as a condition to parenting time. While the parent is undergoing treatment, the court can order supervised parenting time to make sure the children see the parent, but also making sure they are safe.

If substance abuse is part of the illness, there are options to make sure a child is not with a parent who is intoxicated. In addition to random drug testing, which the court can order as a condition of parenting time, there are devices, similar to mini breathalyzers to detect alcohol and certain other substances. These can be carried on someone’s person, in a pocket or purse, and they will be sent a random text instructing them to blow into it. A report will then be sent to the custodial parent, who can take steps to protect the children.

Sometimes, a child will suffer from a mental illness and the parents may differ as to the existence of the illness or for its treatment. This often results in a health care provider refusing to treat in the absence of agreement. In that case, either parent can petition the court for assistance, and an order allowing treatment.



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The Three Tests for Confidentiality of Litigation Documents

In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation, ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 2019). This appeal had an unusual subject: whether certain documents that defendant GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) had designated as confidential in the District Court, pursuant to a protective order, but which were filed in connection with summary judgment proceedings, could go into […]

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Spoliation of Evidence in Construction Litigation

In the context of construction litigation, it is always important to consider a potential claim for the spoliation of evidence regardless if you are the owner or general contractor seeking to backcharge a lower tier contractor, or the subcontractor against whom a backcharge is being sought.

The resolution of a spoliation of evidence motion could result in the dismissal of all claims related to backcharges sought by an upper tier contractor or owner. This could result in a judgment in favor of the lower tier contractor if appropriate precautions are not taken to prevent a claim for spoliation of evidence.

In general, spoliation of evidence involves a scenario where an upper tier contractor or owner has corrective or reparative work performed concerning work performed by a lower tier contractor before giving the lower tier an opportunity to review and inspect the allegedly defective work. The foundation for this claim is that neither the upper tier contractor nor owner can deny the lower tier contractor a right to review the work to determine if the work is defective, and, moreover, to determine the fair cost to correct or remediate the work.

In the context of construction litigation, if the owner or upper tier contractor failed to give the subcontractor an opportunity to inspect the work prior to remediation, any claim for backcharges related to the allegedly defective work could be dismissed by the Court. That is why it is essential to preserve evidence for review by the lower tier.

If an owner or upper tier contractor possesses a backcharge against a lower tier contractor for defective or incomplete work, this party must provide a full and fair opportunity for the lower tier contractor to review the work, and moreover, to witness the remediation of the work, if possible, in order to avoid any potential spoliation of evidence claims.

The generally accepted way to notify the lower tier contractor is by certified mail, return receipt requested, personal, or via email communications or letters which are confirmed receipt by the lower tier contractor. The key component is that the upper tier contractor or owner must make certain that the lower tier contractor has been given notice as to the defective condition or incomplete work.

Furthermore, the upper contractor or owner must give the lower tier contractor the opportunity to inspect the defective work or have an expert exam the defective work, and moreover, to observe the remediation process if possible. If these steps are taken, the lower tier contractor cannot assert that the evidence was spoiled, but instead, can only assert that the remedial work was not necessary.

In the context of the construction litigation, if the appropriate precautions are taken then the owner upper tier contractor will be able to assert this backcharge and the Court will consider this evidence. On the other hand, if a subcontractor has not been provided with the appropriate notice, the subcontractor could object to the introduction of such evidence at Trial and the owner or upper tier contractor may be foreclosed.

For these reasons, it is necessary that both sides pay close attention to potential spoliation of evidence claims in the context of construction litigation. While each side has different concerns as to whether or not the evidence is spoilated, both sides should be aware as to this general legal principal.



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Wednesday, May 22, 2019

Negotiating Future College Contributions in Divorce: A Cautionary Tale

graduation child

A recent Appellate Division case reminds us of the potential pitfalls of negotiating contingent issues in property settlement agreements, specifically as it relates to contribution to future college costs of children born of the marriage.

In Zegarski v. Zegarski, the parties had four children, with the two oldest already attending in-state college at the time of their divorce. Their post judgment litigation stemmed from a disagreement about their respective contributions to the college costs of their third child, four years after their divorce.

The parties’ PSA provided that both parents would contribute equally to “all reasonable and agreed upon college and secondary education costs…after any and all financial aid is received by said children.” The agreement further required the parties to “consult with each other and with the children with a view toward providing each child with the best education possible in view of their particular circumstances, each child’s educational abilities and desires, and the parties’ then existing financial ability.”

During their third child’s college selection process, the child expressed an interest in pursuing engineering and received offers of admission from a private out-of-state university and to Rutgers. When the child expressed a preference for the out-of-state school, his father indicated that he could not afford to pay half of the cost of attendance at the out-of-state school. His father remained steadfast in this position, even during an accepted students tour which he attended with the child and his mother. Over the father’s resistance, the child matriculated to the out-of-state school. When the father refused to pay for 50% of the education costs, the child’s mother sought  contribution and counsel fees.

Following a failed attempt to mediate the issues, the trial court determined that the father was not required to pay for half of the out-of-state education costs because he did not agree to them. However, the trial court found it would be “terribly inequitable” to absolve the father of any financial responsibility.  Accordingly, without a plenary hearing, the trial court surmised that the father’s contribution should be based on the cost of attending Rutgers, where the parties’ oldest two children went to school.  Without creating a record of what that cost would be, the trial court concluded that in-state tuition would likely cost $20,000 per year after financial aid, and ordered the father to contribute that half that amount for the first year, with a 5% inflation adjustment for subsequent years.  Both parties appealed, dissatisfied with the mandated contribution.

First, the Appellate Division concluded that the PSA did not require the father to pay half of the child’s out-of-state costs because he did not agree with them, which was an essential term of the agreement.  The court rejected the mother’s argument that mere consultation about college was sufficient.  The court further held that it would not enforce “an agreement to agree” to the extent one was implied in the agreement by the mother.

The court next determined that the PSA was silent as to allocation of college expenses in the event the parties did not agree. Accordingly, the trial court erroneously failed to address the Newburgh v. Arrigo and statutory factors which apply in the absence of an agreement.

Second, the court found the trial court to ascribe too much weight to its determination of what amount the parties would have likely paid for college in the absence of divorce.  The court warned that such hypotheticals are conjecture and “fraught with uncertainty,” which is why that is but one of many Newburgh factors to consider.

Third, the court held that there cannot be a cap on a party’s contribution at the cost of in-state tuition where the balance of the Newburgh factors favors a private school.  Here, the court found that the trial court did not make an appropriate analysis of this issue. Further, the trial court’s conclusion that in-state tuition would cost $20,000 lacked evidential support in the record.

In sum, the Appellate Division remanded the case for an analysis of the Newburgh and statutory factors in light of the PSA’s silence on this issue under these facts. This decision is illuminating for several reasons. Generally, it is a cautionary tale on an agreement-drafting issue that applies beyond just college contribution.  How can one adequately address future/contingent events in an agreement? If it’s too specific, it cannot account for the number of outcomes which may arise down the line. If it’s too vague, this decision tells us the court must revert to the statutory and case law precedent, regardless of the parties’ intention to resolve the issue by way of a PSA.

With regard to college, this task is even more challenging when the children implicated by the agreement are young. How can one specifically address college contributions  for babies and small children? In Zegarski, negotiating a term which would have applied in the event the parents could not agree on college selection would have given the court something to interpret, and may have spared the reversion to the default, precedential statute and case law. While impossible to account for every possible contingency, the wise and wary drafter should take a step back and ensure the agreement does not include a foregone conclusion that leaves a gap in the agreement if that outcome does not come to pass.

Interestingly, the Appellate Division’s decision made no mention of the child’s actual out-of-state’s education costs. This opinion plainly was not predicated on any dollars and cents inequities of the trial court’s rulings.  The decision offers a helpful reminder to place equal emphasis on the language of the agreement which is to be enforced/set aside and the monetary implications of its implementation.

__________________________________________________________________

 

Katherine A. Nunziata, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLPKatherine A. Nunziata is an associate in the firm’s Family Law practice, based in the Morristown, NJ office. You can reach Katherine at (973-548-3324) or at knunziata@foxrothschild.com.



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Monday, May 20, 2019

A Busy Few Weeks for the Appellate Division

In the last several weeks, this blog has largely focused on Supreme Court decisions and grants of review. That was not meant to slight the Appellate Division, whose judges have made some important rulings as well. Here are summaries of some of the most significant published rulings of the Appellate Division during that period: Sosa […]

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Religion and Divorce: Raising Children of Interfaith Marriages Post-Divorce

Raising children born of interfaith marriages can have its challenges (and of course, its unique joys – Chrismukkah, anyone?), but at least parents in intact families navigate and mediate these challenges together.  If and when parents of different religious faiths divorce, the questions of whether and how to raise the children in a particular religion while respecting the traditions of both parents and their families are difficult ones to answer.

New Jersey’s case law on this subject is straightforward.  The case of Feldman v. Feldman, 378 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 2005) tells us that the custodial parent ultimately controls the children’s religious upbringing, absent some sort of agreement specifying otherwise.  However, this does not prevent the non-custodial parent from engaging in his or her own religious practices and exposing the children to those customs during his or her parenting time.  Put another way, the custodial parent cannot go so far as to control the non-custodial parent’s own religious practices; likewise, the non-custodial parent cannot take any action that interferes with the religious upbringing of the children.

Image result for interfaith public domain image

The recent unpublished (non-precedential) Appellate Division decision Dilisi v. Dilisi illustrated the balance that must be struck in order to both uphold the custodial parent’s authority on this issue and also support the non-custodial parent’s religious freedom.  In that case, the Mother was the custodial parent and the Father the non-custodial parent.  Their divorce decree contained an agreement that the children would be raised in the Roman Catholic faith, which was the faith of the Mother.  The Father had been bringing the children to a non-denominational Christian church during his parenting time on alternate weekends.  The children continued to be raised as Roman Catholics and engaged in all of the usual religious practices of that faith, without interference from the Father.

The lower court interpreted the parties’ agreement that the children would be raised in the Roman Catholic faith as an agreement that, if the children were to attend church, then it would be a Roman Catholic church.  The lower court judge, therefore, ordered the Father to stop bringing the children to his church during his parenting time, and directed that he could only bring the children to a Roman Catholic church.

The Appellate Division overturned this decision, finding that the Father was not doing anything to impinge on the Mother’s authority as the custodial parent to determine the children’s religion, because even though he was bringing them to a different type of religious service, they were still being raised as Roman Catholics.  Further, to prohibit the Father from going to his desired church service during his parenting time forced him to choose between practicing the religion his daughters were being raised in, or no religion at all.  This, the Court found, was a violation of the Father’s own religious freedom and, therefore, was a bridge too far.

If you are going through a divorce and yours is an interfaith marriage, this is something to consider when negotiating the terms of a settlement agreement.  While religious differences may or may not have been a major source of marital strife, they may become an issue post-divorce.  It is important to know that the custodial parent will be given preference in this area unless you agree to the contrary or specifically identify this issue as one in which neither party is to be given priority.


headshot_diamond_jessicaJessica C. Diamond is an associate in the firm’s Family Law Practice, resident in the Morristown, NJ, office. You can reach Jessica at (973) 994.7517 or jdiamond@foxrothschild.com.



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The Supreme Court Will Review Three Published Appellate Division Decisions, and One Unpublished One

The Supreme Court announced that it has granted review in four more cases. In three of those appeals, the Court granted petitions for certification. In the fourth case, the Court granted certification and leave to appeal. Three of the appeals involve published opinions of three-judge panels of the Appellate Division. In The Plastic Surgery Center, […]

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Wednesday, May 15, 2019

Feuer v. Merck & Co., Inc., ___ N.J. ___ (2019). As discussed here, the Appellate Division, in an opinion by Judge Ostrer that was reported at 455 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 2019), affirmed (after de novo review of the legal issues involved) a ruling of the Chancery Division that had ruled against plaintiff, a […]

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The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Scope, Reach, and Safe Harbors

With businesses engaging in increasingly more commerce over the internet, it is crucial to understand the consequences of displaying, using, and transferring another entity’s works online. Enter The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998, which was signed into law by President Clinton to keep pace with the new realities of internet technology and commerce. The Act sought to protect intellectual property rights while simultaneously advancing the growth and development of e-commerce.

The DMCA is divided into five titles.

  • Title I implements the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties and makes it unlawful to manufacture or distribute products, services, or technologies that can be used to circumvent any technological measures intended to control access to copyrighted works, such as passwords or encryptions.
  • Title II contains various “safe harbors” for internet service providers (ISPs) that limit their liability for direct, contributory, or vicarious copyright infringement.
  • Title III creates an exemption from infringement liability for computer program copying conducted for purposes of repair, diagnosis, or troubleshooting.
  • Title IV contains miscellaneous provisions for items such as ephemeral recordings and the transfer of rights to motion pictures.
  • Title V creates a new form of protection for vessel hull designs, overturning the United States Supreme Court’s Bonito Boats decision, which denied copyright protection to such boat designs.

Under the DMCA, ISPs such as AT&T, Comcast Xfinity, and Verizon, cannot be held liable for copyright infringement when they neither know, nor have reason to know, that they are providing internet services to a website that is engaged in copyright infringement. The safe harbors include:

  • A “storage safe harbor” that protects an online service provider’s hosting and storing, and makes available infringing matter stored at a third-party user’s direction.
  • A “transmission safe harbor” that protects the transmitting or providing of a connection to infringing material, typically evoked by telecommunications companies.
  • A “caching safe harbor” that protects an ISP from liability for intermediate and temporary storage of a third-party’s infringing material on a system or network either controlled or operated by the service provider or for the service provider.
  • A safe harbor for search engine websites that protects the linking or referring of users to online third-party locations with infringing material. In order for providers to invoke this protection, internet providers must make an ongoing investigation of their users’ material, “take down” any infringing material once they are made aware of the infringement and inform any of their subscribers of the illegal consequences of making use of that infringing material through, for example, a set of terms and conditions that appear on the site.

In light of the safe harbors, it is important to note what the DMCA does not protect against – trademark infringement, unfair competition, rights of publicity, invasion of privacy, defamation, foreign law copyright claims, the ISP’s own, directly infringing activities, and any collusion between ISPs and third parties to create infringing material. ISPs must therefore continuously monitor third-party conduct in addition to its own conduct to prevent any activity that could lead to liability or loss of an affirmative defense to copyright infringement.

Two recent cases illustrate the complexities of the DMCA. In Disney Enterprises Inc. et al. v. VidAngel Inc., a federal appeals court affirmed an injunction that shut down VidAngel, a web service that lets users stream Hollywood films without seeing nudity or violence. VidAngel essentially purchased authorized copies of DVDs and Blu-ray discs, decrypted one disc of each film to create a digital, unauthorized copy of the work, removed objectionable violent or obscene content from its created copy, and streamed a filtered version of the copy to its customers. Finding that VidAngel infringed on the studios’ copyrights and violated the ban on circumvention of digital encryption measures (VidAngel bypassed locks on the physical discs in order to upload and stream the movies), the district court issued a preliminary injunction to stop the company from streaming the altered films.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the district court despite VidAngel’s arguments that its actions were lawful because, as purchasers of the DVDs and Blu-ray discs, it was authorized by the Studios to decrypt the technical protection mechanisms installed to view the discs’ contents. The law, however, distinguishes between those entities the content owner authorizes to circumvent the access controls and those the owner authorized to access the work. Falling into the latter category, VidAngel was not be able to claim exemption from copyright liability under DMCA’s safe harbor provisions. The takeaway for business owners is that the DMCA cannot be used as a shield by purchasers of copyrighted works who use them for unlawful copying and dissemination.

In another case, Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017), a celebrity photography company that sells its photographs to celebrity magazines brought suit against LiveJournal for posting 20 of its copyrighted photographs online.

LiveJournal is an online platform where users create and run communities to post and comment on content. LiveJournal utilized the help of three unpaid administrative roles:

  1. “Moderators” who reviewed posts submitted by users to ensure compliance with company rules;
  2. “Maintainers” who reviewed and deleted posts and who had the ability to remove moderators; and
  3. “Owners” who removed maintainers and monitors.

The district court held that the DMCA’s safe harbor provision protected LiveJournal from liability since the photos were stored at the direction of its users and not LiveJournal itself. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, however, using principles of the law of agency, the court ruled that the moderators might be “agents” of the websites they police and could lose DMCA safe harbor immunity if they permit infringing content to be posted. The court stated that moderators were provided with specific directions from LiveJournal, and LiveJournal employees substantively supervised, selected, and removed the moderators. On the other hand, moderators were also free to stop working for LiveJournal and volunteer their time elsewhere. Nonetheless, the court vacated the lower court’s order denying discovery of the moderators’ identities because it believed that the newfound, possible agency relationship impacted the decision to conceal the moderators’ identities.

The implications of the LiveJournal decision remain unclear. Some have criticized the holding as inconsistent with the DMCA framework because the statute was enacted to create a safe harbor that broadly protects service providers for material stored at the direction of its users, not literally for material stored directly by users themselves. But going forward, internet businesses and content providers who previously approved and monitored posts the way LiveJournal did may consider opting to forego such thorough oversight of its users’ posted content if they believe they would be unable to assert a safe harbor defense to copyright infringement.



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Tuesday, May 14, 2019

When New Issues Arise on Appeal, Appellate Division Should Conduct Oral Argument Even if No Party Originally Requested It

State in the Interest of D.M., ___ N.J. ___ (2019). In this juvenile delinquency case, neither the State nor defendant sought oral argument in the Appellate Division. The State, the respondent in that court, explained that it believed the issues raised by defendant on appeal of the Family Part’s finding of delinquency by endangering the […]

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Updates to Public Recreational Bathing Code Subsequent to January 2018 Revisions

If your community association has a pool, you are probably well aware of the sweeping changes made to the Public Recreational Bathing Code (Bathing Code) in January 2018. You may not, however, be aware of two updates since those revisions were implemented.

To understand the updates, a brief background of the Bathing Code and the January 2018 revisions will be helpful. Even though their pools are private, community associations of three or more units are considered “specially exempt facilities” under the Bathing Code. This means that the association can choose to voluntarily comply with the lifeguard and first aid personnel requirements of the Bathing Code or choose not to comply.

Pools with diving boards, water slides, and similar equipment were not eligible for the exemption. Among many other requirements, the January 2018 Bathing Code revisions also required pools to submit a Checklist each year, prohibited lifeguards from performing any tasks that would take attention away from the pool, and set new requirements for pool circulation systems.

Now, on to the updates.

The Department of Health clarified the lifeguard requirements for pools exercising their exempt status in an April 2018 update to its web page FAQs. The clarification states that a hybrid approach to lifeguard staffing is permissible and an association need not choose between zero lifeguards and the full lifeguard staffing as required under the Bathing Code.

This means that a community association may choose to not comply with the Bathing Code lifeguard requirements but may still employ a lifeguard on certain busy summer days if it chooses to do so. This update clarifies the Bathing Code and was not a change to the law itself.

The second update, effective January 31, 2019, was a change to the Bathing Code. These 2019 Bathing Code revisions:

  1. Allow specially exempt facilities to exercise their exemptions even if their pool has a diving board, water slide, or similar equipment,
  2. Make the Checklist optional for pools; the local inspector may choose to rely on the Checklist in lieu of an actual inspection,
  3. Allow lifeguards to perform minor administrative tasks as long as they can still observe bathers and provide immediate assistance to bathers in distress in the water, and
  4. Confirm that swimming pool circulation systems in place as of January 1, 2018, need not comply with the new requirements of the Bathing Code until the system is altered (altered does not include normal maintenance or replacement of equipment).

The April 2018 clarification about lifeguard staffing and the 2019 Bathing Code revisions do not address all of the concerns community associations may have with regard to the Bathing Code as revised in January 2018. However, a few issues are clarified and a few requirements that were a concern have been modified.

If you are a board member or manager with questions about the Public Recreational Bathing Code, please contact me.



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Thursday, May 9, 2019

Jackson Hewitt Hit with “No Poaching” Clause Lawsuit

The second largest consumer tax preparer in the United States has just been hit with a lawsuit filed by former employees alleging a “no-poach” conspiracy between the company and its franchisees, according to a complaint filed in New Jersey federal court.

In the suit, the former Jackson Hewitt employees seek to represent any person who worked at one of the tax company’s locations between January 2000 and December 2018. This proposed class action suit is seeking treble damages, attorney fees, and an injunction that would prohibit the company from using agreements that prevent employees from moving between Jackson Hewitt locations going forward.

In the complaint, the former employees allege the Jackson Hewitt franchise agreements required franchisees to agree to not hire one another’s employees or employee candidates. The employees allege that the conspiracy limited opportunities for mobility and compensation for employees, who were themselves not parties to the agreements.

The company started including a “no-poach” provision in its franchise agreements in 2000. In 2015, the company began including a “recruiting fee” that gave it the right to charge a franchisee a penalty for hiring an employee from another Jackson Hewitt location.

The plaintiffs contend that the purpose of these clauses was to discourage franchisees from hiring employees of the company, reducing transparency within the company and keeping wages low and stagnant in an industry that was already highly specialized.

This is not the first time allegations of this kind have been made against Jackson Hewitt. A similar case was previously filed against Jackson Hewitt in New Jersey court, but it was dropped in January 2019.

Several other notable franchises have come under fire in the last year over similar no-poach agreements, including many in the restaurant industry, like McDonald’s, Cinnabon, and Arby’s. In the fall of 2018, eight national restaurant chains agreed to drop their no poaching agreements shortly after 10 states announced they would be investigating these practices.

The focus on no-poaching provisions in franchise agreements will likely continue to be in the spotlight for the foreseeable future and will serve as a continuation of the struggle between franchise companies and the employees of their franchisees. This struggle has been highlighted over the last few years as a result of the NLRB’s “joint employer” decisions. For now, franchisors should take a hard look at their franchise agreements and speak with counsel about the best approach given the current climate.



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Wednesday, May 8, 2019

The Appellate Division Redresses a “Train Wreck”

Zahl v. Eastland, 2019 WL _______ (App. Div. May 8, 2019). [Disclosure: I argued this appeal for the successful defendants-appellants, having come into the case after the Law Division entered judgment against defendants]. This was a legal malpractice case in which the Law Division entered a default judgment against defendants of over $1,057,000. Defendants appealed, […]

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The Futility of Parent Coordination When a Parent Coordinator Won’t Be Decisive

I have written many times over the years regarding parent coordination, both during and after the end of the Supreme Court pilot program.  A parent coordinator is a person, sometimes a mental health professional and sometimes a lawyer, that is appointed to assist parties in high conflict custody disputes.  The description and function of a parenting coordinator under the pilot program were as follows:

A Parenting Coordinator is a qualified neutral person appointed by the court, or agreed to by the parties, to facilitate the resolution of day to day parenting issues that frequently arise within the context of family life when parents are separated. The court may appoint a Parenting Coordinator at any time during a case involving minor children after a parenting plan has been established when the parties cannot resolve these issues on their own.

The Parenting Coordinator’s goal is to aid parties in monitoring the existing parenting plan, reducing misunderstandings, clarifying priorities, exploring possibilities for compromise and developing methods of communication that promote collaboration in parenting. The Parenting Coordinator’s role is to facilitate decision making between the parties or make such recommendations, as may be appropriate, when the parties are unable to do so. One primary goal of the Parenting Coordinator is to empower parents to develop and utilize effective parenting skills so that they can resume the parenting and decision-making role without the need for outside intervention. The Parenting Coordinator should provide guidance and direction to the parties with the primary focus on the best interests of the child by reducing conflict and fostering sound decisions that aid positive child development.

The goals are laudatory and make sense.  That said, they often didn’t work because the intransigent party would not follow the parent coordinator’s recommendations.  In these circumstances, if the court order required the parties to bring parenting issues to a parent coordinator first before coming to court, and one party wasn’t going to follow the recommendation, the result was often a several month delay until something got decided by a court.  Separately, the problem parent, assuming one was worse than the other, would present any issue, every issue to the parent coordinator, using the process as a way to abuse the other parent.  This sometimes could be dealt with with a fee shifting provision, but again, if the party didn’t comply with the fee shifting provision, then back to court the parties went anyway.

Over the last several years, I have seen parenting coordination Orders that provide that the parties must follow the parent coordinator’s recommendation, unless and until it was modified by the Court and moreover, it put the onus on the objecting party to bring the matter to court (but comply pending the decision).  Note that court’s cannot totally abdicate decision making to a PC and this is not a total abdication because there is a right to object to the Court.

That seemed like progress except when the parent coordinator refuses to enforce their recommendations.  In a recent matter, both the Court’s Order of appointment and the parenting coordinator’s own retainer agreement provided language that his recommendations were binding until modified by a court.  Except that the father would never accept or follow the recommendations, and also not go to court to set them aside)and the PC would often relent.  I have heard of another recent matter with a similar mandate that was in a Consent Order requiring that the parties follow the PC’s recommendations or file a motion within a certain number of days from the recommendation if they objected.  The objecting parent will not comply and the PC is not putting her foot down.  Not only does this empower the offending parent, but it further delays resolution and continues to victimize the parent that is in the right.

Often, the explanation is that the PC wants the parties ultimately to come to a consensus.  In most cases, however, if they were able to do that, they wouldn’t need a PC in the first place.  More importantly, the role is not mediator or therapist.  The goal is to not be even handed or Solomonic where you have one parent that is the offender the majority of the time.  If the PC cannot make the tough recommendation and stand behind it, their appointment is pointless and a waste of the parties’ resources.  Moreover, it allows the offending party to continue to use the process to harass and abuse the other party.

_________________________________________

 Eric Solotoff is the editor of the New Jersey Family Legal Blog and the Co-Chair of the Family Law Practice Group of Fox Rothschild LLP. Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Lawyer and a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys, Eric is resident in Fox Rothschild’s Morristown, New Jersey office though he practices throughout New Jersey. You can reach Eric at (973) 994-7501, or esolotoff@foxrothschild.com.

 



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Breach of Fiduciary Duty Not Dischargeable in Bankruptcy

If a party brings an action alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by a person holding a Power of Attorney, or by an Executor of the Estate, this party should be aware that this judgment may have a lasting impact should it be obtained.

In general, most civil judgments are dischargeable in bankruptcy should the judgment debtor file for bankruptcy. With regard to a breach of fiduciary duty, however, these judgments are often non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.

What that means is that the judgment cannot be discharged should the judgment debtor file for bankruptcy, but instead, will remain intact after the bankruptcy action. This fact can be used during settlement negotiations in an attempt to resolve such a lawsuit without the necessity of a Trial.

The rationale for not discharging a breach of fiduciary duty judgment is that the bankruptcy courts deem such a finding to be a “defalcation,” or improper conduct, which is not a dischargeable debt. The case law is clear on this issue and it is not unusual that a breach of fiduciary duty judgment is discharged by a bankruptcy court. As such, a judgment for breach of fiduciary duty is strong and has long lasting effects.

Thus, if a party possesses a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a person operating under a Power of Attorney or the Executor of an Estate, it is strongly recommended that this claim be prosecuted.

As an added bonus, a party may be entitled to an award of counsel fees under such a claim as well. For these reasons, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is an important claim that should be asserted any time it is supported by the facts in the context of probate or related litigation.



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Tuesday, May 7, 2019

Charitable Immunity Sweeps Broadly to Protect Monmouth University

Green v. Monmouth University, ___ N.J. ___ (2019). In a unanimous opinion by Justice Fernandez-Vina today, the Supreme Court resolved a case that had divided the Appellate Division, as discussed here. The question involved charitable immunity for an injury sustained at a concert by country singer Martina McBride that was held at Monmouth University’s Multipurpose […]

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Can an Employer Legally Withdraw a Job Offer after It’s Been Made?

Question: Can an employer legally withdraw a prospective employee’s job offer before that particular individual actually begins working at the company?

It happens more frequently than one might think, but under a variety of different circumstances. There are many reasons why a company might rescind an offer of employment, such as: a candidate’s criminal history, failed drug test, or unsatisfactory background check results; negative references; falsification of application materials; budget cuts; cancelled or postponed projects or contracts with customers; installment of a new executive; an eleventh-hour, about-face decision change by the hiring manager; belated realization of previously unnoticed or overlooked evaluation-altering information about the candidate; unfavorable post-offer experience or interactions with the candidate; and many others.

Whereas one situation may implicate certain legal considerations, another situation may require the consideration of a completely different set of legal issues and concerns. Some of these issues are discussed in prior posts by my colleagues—e.g., pre-employment drug screenings (here) and criminal background checks (here).

The focus of this post, however, is unique in that it relates to a legal issue that potentially cuts across the entire spectrum of reasons an employer may rescind an offer of employment—to wit, the employer’s potential exposure to liability for damages suffered by the prospective employee in reliance on the employer’s unfulfilled promise of employment. In New Jersey, this is a very real risk. There are, however, some simple steps and precautions employers and employees alike can take to mitigate their respective risks, better protect their respective interests, and overall mutually benefit parties on both sides of the prospective employment relationship.

The general rule in New Jersey—and in nearly every other state—is that employment relationships are, by default, presumed to be “at-will.” This means that absent some agreement to the contrary, the employment relationship may be terminated at any time, by the employer or the employee, for any reason or no reason, with or without cause or notice, so long as the reason is not statutorily prohibited or otherwise unlawful (e.g., discrimination on the basis of the employee’s membership in a protected class or retaliation for engaging in protected whistleblowing activity).

Generally, this means that when an employer makes an offer of at-will employment, the employer is free to rescind that job offer, for any reason or no reason at all, at any time, including the period after the potential employee has accepted the offer but before he or she begins work, without legal consequence. Even in the absence of a binding contract of employment or violation of some statutory proscription, however, the at-will employment doctrine is not an absolute shield to liability.

Sometimes, withdrawing the offer of employment before the prospective employee has started work may expose the employer to liability in an action by the employee for the damages resulting from repudiation of the offer (or, if already “accepted,” termination prior to commencement of employment). In certain states, including New Jersey, a judicial exception to the at-will employment doctrine has been carved out for certain circumstances where an employer rescinds an offer of employment after the prospective employee has relied on that offer to his or her detriment, such as by leaving another job or moving.

In contrast, courts in other jurisdictions, like New York, have rejected such a claim as a matter of law, declining to make a distinction between the time period before and after at-will employment begins.

A cause of action for promissory estoppel is well-recognized under New Jersey law in the context of at-will employment generally and, in particular, arising from the revocation of an employment offer. New Jersey courts have applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to such circumstances—where a prospective employee has left another job, moved, or otherwise incurred expense in reliance on an offer of at-will employment which the employer later rescinded or withdrew. See, e.g., Peck v. Imedia, Inc., 293 N.J. Super. 151, 167-68 (App. Div. 1996).

Depending on the facts in a particular matter, breach of a promise to hire an employee, even an “at will” employee, upon which a prospective employee relies, may give rise to an award of damages for breach of that promise under this doctrine. Id. at 162, 167. Thus, in Peck, the New Jersey Appellate Division held that even when a job is terminable at will, a promissory estoppel claim can arise from rescission or revocation of a job offer “where there is denial of a good faith opportunity to perform after a prospective employee has resigned from an existing position in reliance upon a firm job offer.” Id. at 167-68; see also Bonczek v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 304 N.J. Super. 593, 599 (App. Div. 1997) (same).

To recover against a former prospective employer on a theory of promissory estoppel in the job offer rescission context, the spurned employee must prove: (1) there was a clear and definite promise of employment by the employer; (2) the employer made the promise with the expectation the employee would rely upon it; (3) the employee reasonably did rely on the promise; and (4) he or she incurred a definite and substantial detriment as a result of such reliance. See Peck, 293 N.J. Super. at 165.

Although the factual nuances can vary greatly from one case to the next, at a basic level a typical scenario supporting such a claim may look something like this:

After several rounds of interviews and lengthy negotiations regarding the position, salary, relocation, and other details, a New Jersey employee (“Employee”) is offered a management position with a Fortune 500 company at the company’s headquarters in California. One of the company’s hiring partners conveys the offer to Employee over the phone and mails a written offer letter detailing the position being offered, title, benefits, salary, location, supervisor, start date, a summary of the onboarding process, and other information. Employee accepts and mails back the signed offer letter.

Prior to Employee’s scheduled start date, the hiring partner encourages Employee to put his New Jersey home on the market, purchase a new home for him and his family near the company’s corporate headquarters in California, make the necessary arrangements for the move, and give his New Jersey employer notice of his resignation. Employee does all of this only to receive a call one week before his scheduled start date at the new company rescinding the offer. At that point, Employee contacts his boss from his then-former employer in New Jersey with the hope of retaining or getting back his job, but it is too late as the position has already been filled and there are no other openings. Meanwhile, Employee has incurred tens of thousands of dollars in out-of-pocket expenses preparing for the cross-country move that is no longer happening.

Fast-forward six months, and Employee finally has managed to re-sell the property previously purchased in California at only a moderate loss, but still is not able to secure a new job until after another four months go by.

In the above scenario, if the employee did everything he was supposed to do and had no blemishes on his record, and if the hiring partner induced the employee to resign from gainful employment and sell his home while purchasing a new one in California, the availability of the promissory estoppel doctrine under such circumstances serves its essential purpose: to avoid the substantial hardship or injustice which would result if such a promise were not enforced.

When these situations arise, they can be a crushing blow financially (especially with the likely unavailability of unemployment benefits). The promissory estoppel doctrine tempers those harsh consequences by placing the aggrieved former employee or candidate back in the same position he or she would have been in had the relied-upon offer of employment never been made in the first place.

Thus, assuming Employee’s reliance was reasonable and intended, Employee could recover damages consisting of lost earnings he would have received from his former employer had he not detrimentally relied on the promise, as well as the amounts spent for moving expenses and possibly money lost from selling real property at a loss.

There will always be times where employers want or may be legally required to withdraw previously conveyed offers of employment. Knowing that, what can employers do to best insulate themselves from these kinds of claims? While employers throughout the State should review their current hiring practices, policies and procedures, and work with experienced employment counsel to confirm these processes and update and revise them as needed, here are three starting points:

First, employers should be clear with candidates about any pre-employment screenings and other conditions precedent to actual employment that must be satisfied. If an offer is conditional, that should be clearly conveyed to the candidate. This will strengthen the company’s defenses against potential job offer rescission claims brought by job applicants whose offers were withdrawn due to their failure to satisfy stated contingencies.

Second, when a conditional offer of employment is being made, the offer letter should clearly state that the prospective employee should not give notice of his or her resignation to his or her then present employer until he or she receives written confirmation that he or she has successfully satisfied all preconditions of employment.

In furtherance of this point, employers should implement appropriate policies and procedures to ensure that everyone involved in the employment process understands and abides by that same directive. No matter how clear an employer’s offer letters and other employment forms are, all it takes is one person from the employer to indicate prematurely that someone is safe to give his or her two weeks’ notice for that applicant to have an actionable claim if the offer of employment is subsequently withdrawn. See, e.g., Schley v. Microsoft Corp., No. 08-3589 (DRD), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96059 (D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2008) (despite clear and unambiguous language in offer letter that employment offer was conditional on successful completion of criminal background check, plaintiff had viable claim against Microsoft for revoking offer due to failure to satisfy condition where Microsoft hiring manager had pushed plaintiff to resign from previous job and search for new home across the country).

Third, offer letters should also state that the letter is neither intended nor should be considered to be a contract of employment for a definite or indefinite period of time, and that any employment offered is and solely will be employment at-will. The prospective employee or applicant should be required to sign and return an acknowledgment to this effect.

While all three of the above points are crucial to the analysis, employers should revisit their employment processes, procedures, and forms, and should work with experienced employment counsel to minimize risk in connection with the hiring process.

Whether you are an employer seeking guidance or concerned about compliance, or an employee or job applicant seeking recourse from wrongful rescission of a job offer, the labor and employment attorneys at Stark & Stark are here to help.



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Monday, May 6, 2019

The Supreme Court Takes Three More Cases

The Supreme Court announced today that it has granted review in three new cases. One of them is before the Court on leave to appeal, while the other two involve grants of certification The leave to appeal case is State v. Andrews. The question presented there, as formulated by the Supreme Court Clerk’s office, is […]

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Friday, May 3, 2019

Grandparents May Not Be Entitled To Visitation Even With A Signed Agreement

Grandparent visitation is a unique area of family law that presents interesting case law every few years and seems to be growing with time and modern families.  We have blogged about this issue, including the requirement to show harm to the child if the grandparent doesn’t have visitation and procedure for grandparent visitation applications, as well as impact of Consent Orders between parents and grandparents for visitation with the child.   The Appellate Division just released an unpublished (non-precedential) decision in a consolidated appeal that touches upon both the harm requirement for cases reviewed under the Grandparent Visitation Act, as well as issues with consent agreements for grandparent visitation: L.S. and L.V. v. F.S. and S.P.M./L.S. and L.V. v. F.S. and A.K.

The case answered two unique questions:

  1. Whether a grandparent visitation claim can be dismissed without a plenary hearing.
    • Yes. “Where a grandparent cannot make a threshold showing of harm, the complaint should be dismissed.”
  2. Whether a change in circumstances is required in order to modify the agreement between one parent and the grandparents when the agreement is not incorporated into an enforceable judgment or Court Order.
    • No. “…[G]randparent visitation agreements should be subject to a change of circumstances standard only if the agreement is incorporated  into an order or judgment and an application to the court is made for “modification of a consent order governing grandparent visitation”‘.

While those answers may seem simple, the facts of this case are nothing short of intriguing.  The plaintiffs in both matters are paternal grandma and great grandma.  The defendants in both matters are dad (F.S.) and former wife (S.P.M.), and dad (F.S.) and current wife (A.K.).  In both matters, plaintiffs sought parenting time with F.S.’ children/their grand and great grandchildren (1 child in the S.P.M. matter and 3 children in the A.K. matter, 1 of whom is A.K.’s child from another relationship who F.S. was adopting).

F.S. and S.P.M.

F.S. and S.P.M. had their daughter, Ellen, at young ages as she was born in 2011 and S.P.M. turned 18 in 2013.  Plaintiffs claim that Ellen, F.S. and S.P.M. lived with plaintiffs until they moved to a home near great grandma’s house.  However, S.P.M. claims she only lived with plaintiffs on the weekends.  Regardless, it appears undisputed that Plaintiffs brought F.S. and S.P.M. into the family business and paid the majority of their expenses.  Plaintiffs also claim that when the F.S. and S.P.M. moved into their own home, plaintiffs provided daycare services, the family had most dinners in plaintiffs’ home and Ellen spent a weekly overnight in plaintiffs’ home.  Eventually, F.S. and S.P.M. separated and got divorced.  F.S. had supervised parenting time with Ellen in plaintiffs’ home with great grandma as the selected supervisor and S.P.M. also present.  S.P.M. moved in with F.S.’ aunt and uncle and engaged in a relationship with the uncle (i.e.: grandma’s brother-in-law).  F.S. was abusing drugs (which was blamed on this relationship).  In any event, S.P.M. remained close with F.S.’ family and Ellen visited with grandma at least 3-4 days per week and they had daily telephone contact.  F.S.’ parenting time with Ellen continued at plaintiffs’ home until she was three years old.

F.S. and A.K.

Meanwhile, F.S. started a relationship with A.K.  and they lived together in plaintiffs’ home with A.K.’s child from a prior relationship.  They moved out after the birth of their first child together.  When F.S. had parenting time with Ellen, A.K. and their child, as well as A.K.’s child from another relationship, would all have dinner together with plaintiffs and the children spent overnights there. Plaintiffs continued to provide financial support to F.S. and the children.

Breakdown with Plaintiffs

It seems like every party has a different reason for the breakdown between Plaintiffs and each Defendant; however, they all agree the a significant breakdown occurred.  Plaintiffs claim that problems started in 2016, which they blame on F.S. and A.K. extorting money from plaintiffs in order to have visitation, leading to over a year of grandma not having a meaningful relationship with her grandchildren.  In her cross motion, S.P.M. claimed that problems began before then and were primarily related to plaintiffs fueling disagreements between F.S. and S.P.M., instigating child welfare complaints against S.P.M. (that did not result in any findings against S.P.M.) and exposing Ellen to screaming arguments between F.S. and plaintiffs.  At oral argument, F.S. blamed the period of no contact on an argument between F.S. and plaintiffs that then resulted in him being fired from the family business and in a homeless shelter.S.P.M. also explained that once F.S. was estranged from plaintiffs, he and S.P.M. successfully co-parented and Ellen improved in school and in her personal life.  In the year without contact, Ellen spent parenting time with F.S. on weekends and weekdays without incident.  A.K. claimed that during the year of no visitation, grandma refused to visit Ellen in their home even though other family members visited, and that the children were experiencing “peacefulness” during this no contact period.

Grandparent Visitation Agreement

Toward the end of the no contact year, plaintiffs and F.S. entered into an agreement for visitation with the children.  Neither S.P.M. nor A.K. signed the agreement or even knew about the agreement before it was signed.  F.S. thought S.P.M. and A.K. would object to the agreement had he presented it.  The agreement  did not refer to the pending divorce between A. K. and F.S., under which parenting time orders had been entered. The agreement was never entered into an enforceable Court Order or judgment.  Notwithstanding, the agreement had clear terms for regular and summer visitation with plaintiffs, exchange locations, make-up time, anti-alienation clauses and language acknowledging the children’s significant relationship with plaintiffs.

F.S. did not follow the agreement, which plaintiffs claimed was because he still tried to extort them for money in order for them to have visitation under the agreement. F.S. claims he did not cooperate because plaintiffs violated S.P.M.’s wishes, such as posting pictures of the children on social media and letting them in a pool.

Notably, at oral argument, F.S. claimed he did not participate in the drafting or understand that overnights were part of the agreement. Both mothers were opposed to plaintiffs having any contact with their children.

Close up of wooden gavel isolated on white backgroundTrial Court Decision

The trial court heard the matter in November 2017 and dismissed plaintiffs action without a plenary hearing after hearing oral argument.  Plaintiffs and S.P.M. had counsel arguing on their behalf and the court took testimony from F.S. and A.K. who did not have counsel, as well as from S.P.M. regarding lack of harm to the children by not having contact with plaintiffs.  A.K. also acknowledged that she knew about the agreement, but not until after it was signed and she objected to plaintiffs having any contact with the children.

The trial court’s decision considered both enforcement of the agreement and the grandparent visitation rights statute.

Regarding the agreement, the trial court  distinguished this matter from Slawinski v. Nicholas, noted in the above prior blog, involving a Consent Order for grandparent visitation.  However, the agreement here was merely a private agreement and it was not signed by both biological parents.  The trial court further noted that the biological mothers who object to the visitation are fit parents.  The mothers also believe that the relationship between the children’s parents would be impacted by the grandparents having visitation.  F.S. is also a fit parent and also objects to the time.

Regarding the act, plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the children would be exposed to harm without the grandparent visitation, despite the trial court’s acknowledgment of a close relationship between plaintiffs and the children.  This step is required before a court turns to the statutory factors, as explained in the above prior blogs. The trial court noted that two of the four children were infants when the agreement was signed and, thus, could not have had the “profound, substantial and enduring relationships” with plaintiffs as they had claimed; the plaintiffs were never full-time caregivers; and, the mothers were not parties to the agreement.  The trial court went on to state that even if harm was demonstrated, visitation would not be in the children’s best interests because the mothers were fit parents and it would have negatively impacted the parents’ relationship with each other.

Appellate Decision

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s holding.  The Court acknowledged the “value of a child’s relationship with his or her grandparent”.  However, superior to that value is “…the principle that parents have a fundamental right ‘to make decisions regarding the care and custody of their children'”, citing to the polestar case of Moriarty v. Bradt, also discussed in the above prior blogs.  Pursuant to Moriarty, the grandparents must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation is necessary to perform harm to the child, which the grandparents did not accomplish here.  As the Court explained while relying on case law, the statutory factors are only reviewed after this burden to prove harm is met. Thus, the court held that “Where a grandparent cannot make a threshold showing of harm, the complaint should be dismissed“, which is what happened in this matter.  They further stated that “…no evidence [was] presented by plaintiffs that established the requisite showing of particular ‘concrete harm’ to any of the children that would support a finding that plaintiffs overcame the presumption against interference with the parents’ fundamental rights” – focusing on the fact that all parents opposed the visitation and are themselves fit parents, the grandparents were never permanent caretakers of the children and they only speak of general suffering in the event of lost contact.

Regarding the agreement, the court found that it is not enforceable/doesn’t require a change in circumstances to modify.

We concluded in Slawinski that grandparent visitation agreements should be subject to a change of circumstances standard only if the agreement is incorporated into an order or judgment and an application to the court is made for “modification of a consent order governing grandparent visitation

Absent a court order, a parent who agrees orally or in writing to allow grandparent visitation is free to withdraw from that agreement unless the significant harm required by the Act is established.”

Takeaway

After all of that, it’s important to remember the tough burden of proof in grandparent visitation cases before running into court.  Also, if entering into an agreement for grandparent visitation, make sure it’s filed with the Court and both biological fit parents are parties if you foresee any enforcement issues (and even if you don’t).


Lindsay A. Heller is an associate in the firm’s Family Law practice, based in its Morristown, NJ office. You can reach Lindsay at 973.548.3318 or lheller@foxrothschild.com.

Lindsay A. Heller, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP



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