Friday, March 29, 2019

If You Appeal But Don’t Follow Through, Don’t Come Back Later With Your Issues From the Abandoned Appeal

Park Crest Cleaners, LLC v. A Plus Cleaners & Alterations Corp., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2019).  This opinion by Judge Fisher today dismissed an appeal under convoluted facts.  To dramatically oversimplify (and it’s worth reading the opinion, which, characteristically for Judge Fisher, was not long), the parties litigated a commercial case that resulted, […]

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Thursday, March 28, 2019

Law Against Discrimination is Not Limited by the Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act

Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2019).  Plaintiff in this case under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49 (“LAD”), used medical marijuana, as authorized by the Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act, N.J.S.A. 24:6I-1 to -16 (“Compassionate Use Act’), as part of his cancer treatment.  Plaintiff worked for […]

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Wednesday, March 27, 2019

Zoning Board of Adjustment Conflicts of Interest

Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Bd. of Adj., ___ N.J. ___ (2019).  Conflict of interest issues are often sticky.  That was doubly so in this case, which the Supreme Court decided today, since there were not just one but two potential conflicts alleged.  The Supreme Court split 4-3, a relatively rare occurrence.  Justice Albin authored […]

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Protect and Defend Yourself from Domestic Violence Complaints: They Mean More Than You May Think

Domestic violence exists and is real, and unfortunately, is common. This blog is not meant for the traditional domestic violence victim. The rights of true victims are rightly met with protections from the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, which allow for the implementation of a Final Restraining Order that prohibits contact and the presence of the perpetrator away from the victim.

Instead, this blog is to recognize that not all domestic violence complaints (referred to as Temporary Restraining Orders) are based on legitimate allegations warranting permanent relief with a Final Restraining Order and, moreover, have been used “as a sword as opposed to a shield” by purported “victims” at times notwithstanding the incredible burden Final Restraining Orders carry.

Final Restraining Orders in New Jersey, unlike in other states, are permanent. Many people understand the main purpose of a Final Restraining Order from its name’s literal interpretation, namely, that it keeps one person from being in the presence of or contacting the other person.

With this in mind and often the mindset that “I don’t want to contact or be around them anyway,” someone may feel that having a lawyer present with them to defend them is unnecessary. This notion ignores the larger risks associated with appearing for trial without an attorney and having a Final Restraining Order entered against you.

Once a Temporary Restraining Order is entered, a Final Restraining Order hearing (essentially, a trial) is scheduled. This is typically scheduled within 7 to 10 days after the Temporary Restraining Order is issued.

At the hearing, you will be expected to follow the New Jersey Rules of Evidence which, in reality, may prevent you from testifying about what you believe is admissible and therefore, could prevent you from defending yourself as well as you otherwise may believe you could.

The hearing is also decided by a Judge. There are no juries. One judge who does not know you or your accuser will hear testimony and evidence (if properly introduced) and decide whether a Final Restraining Order will be entered against you or not.

The only opportunity to reverse that decision is typically to file an appeal, which can only be successful in very rare, limited instances. The Final Restraining Order hearing, in most cases, is the only opportunity to present your defense.

If that Final Restraining Order is entered, more than restraints are placed on the alleged perpetrator:

  • That party’s name is entered into the New Jersey Domestic Violence Registry. Enrollment shows up on background checks and, in many fields, may hinder or even cost that person their current or prospective employment.
  • That party is under threat of criminal sanction and imprisonment. Violating a Final Restraining Order in any facet results in an immediate arrest and prosecution.
  • If the “victim” and “perpetrator” have children together, the existence of a Final Restraining Order may provide the victim with the presumption of primary custody of the children, which is an enormous advantage if custody litigation follows the alleged domestic violence incident.
  • On a related note, the existence of a Final Restraining Order between parents often makes effective co-parenting, which inherently involves good communication, extremely difficult.

It cannot be emphasized the restraint on your liberty and burden to your family a Final Restraining Order can have, and I must caution you to deal with these issues alone. Everyone has a choice as to whether to represent themselves or to hire an attorney, but I would strongly encourage anyone looking at the possibility of a Final Restraining Order in New Jersey to take the time and speak with an experienced family law attorney.

If you choose to represent yourself and a Final Restraining Order is entered, your only option then may be an appeal which is indisputably expensive to procure in most situations and does not guarantee success. It is, therefore, vitally essential to get your defense in order at the time of the Final Restraining Order hearing (before one is entered) to properly safeguard yourself.



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Novartis Hit with $1.5M Whistleblower Suit, Avoids Punitive Damages

A New Jersey state jury hit Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp with nearly $1.5 million in net damages over a former company executive’s claims that she was fired in retaliation for whistleblowing. The jury in turn rejected the pharma company’s stance that the employee had been properly terminated for violating company policies.

In a 7-1 votes, the jury awarded $1,816,040 to Min Amy Guo in her whistleblower suit, in which she alleged that she was fired from Novartis for raising concerns in 2012 that a potential cancer drug study for Afinitor by the pharmaceutical distribution company McKesson Corp was possibly a kickback to McKesson to help sell the medicine.

The jurors mostly sided with Guo on her state Conscientious Employee Protection Act claim, awarding her the $1.8 million, but then unanimously awarded $345,360.70 to Novartis on the company’s counterclaim of unjust enrichment. This second verdict was based in part on the jury’s finding that Guo had violated company policy as Novartis alleged.

The following day, the eight jury panel in a 7-1 vote decided against awarding punitive damages to Guo, finding that Novartis upper management did not engage in “especially egregious” conduct in connection with her termination.

Guo served as executive director of the health economics and outcomes research group at Novartis until she was terminated in 2013. The next year, she filed a lawsuit under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, which is a law in New Jersey which prohibits all public and private employers from retaliating against who “disclose, object to, or refuse to participate in certain actions that the employees reasonably believe are either illegal or in violation of public policy.”

Guo alleged that she believed that the proposed McKesson study, which was meant to examine the use of Afinitor as a breast cancer drug, would violate a corporate integrity agreement that Novartis entered into in 2010 as part of a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice. The agreement required Npvaris to comply with federal health care program requirements, which included an anti-kickback statute.

McKesson had acquired U.S. Oncology Inc. in 2010, which is one of the largest networks of community-based oncologists in the country. The head of North America oncology at Novartis, Christi Shaw, had been pushing to get the study done in time for the launch of Afinitor as a breast cancer drug, but Guo alleged that her whistleblowing had slowed down that process enough that the study missed the launch, which in turn lead to the retaliation and her firing.

Guo stated that she believed that she had an “objectively reasonable belief” that the initial proposal would violate the corporate integrity agreement and the anti-kickback statue. After Guo objected to the proposal on both “procedural and substantive grounds,” the study proposal was ultimately revised.

Not long after Guo engaged in whistleblowing, Novartis started an investigation that ultimately led to her termination at the company. An economist later testified that Guo had suffered economic losses totaling approximately $5.3 million dollars.

Novartis disagreed with the whistleblower verdict, asserting that Guo “was terminated for legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons, including her violation of company policy.”

According to court documents, Guo’s alleged violations at the company described that she had failed to include a representative from Novartis’ legal or ethics compliance departments on a call with a vendor and the vendor’s counsel after her staff members had raised compliance concerns. In addition, she had allegedly failed to disclose a potential conflict of interest with respect to her position at the company on an advisory council of a support organization for cancer survivors, and she did not recuse herself from the review of a proposed study that involved that aforementioned organization.



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Massachusetts Securities Division Changes the Law Applicable to Investment Advisers Overnight

On March 20, 2019, the Massachusetts Securities Division, Enforcement Section (the “Division”) filed a complaint against an investment adviser located in Massachusetts. The complaint alleged that the firm’s two owners and financial professionals “gambled away millions of dollars in client assets through high risk bets on the oil and gas market.”[1] This author vehemently disagrees with the Division’s complaint and the message it sends to the industry.

Among the injured, the complaint referenced “a widow, a charitable organization, and many senior citizens saving for retirement.” The complaint stated that the firm’s clients had different investment needs, risk tolerances, and financial situations, yet the firm invested nearly all of its clients “primarily in energy-related investments”[2]. The complaint also alleges that the firm placed the “majority”[3] of clients’ assets in energy-related investments. According to the complaint, the investments selected by the firm were “publicly-traded securities that focused on the exploration and development of natural resources, such as oil and natural gas.”

This complaint by the Division is an overreach and an incorrect application of the law, and is an injustice to the entire investment industry. The complaint can only lead to confusion in the industry about which calculated risks it can take in managing its clients’ assets. The complaint was without merit, proof of a prosecutorial mindset of the Division, and a matter of bad policy. In fact, the complaint reminded me of a statement of claim from a FINRA arbitration—not of an enforcement action brought by a state regulator for fraudulent activity by an investment adviser.

If the Division wanted to prove a point to this investment adviser that its Form ADV disclosures to clients were inaccurate, then it was well within its rights. It also was well within its rights to punish this investment adviser for not perfectly following its compliance manual. However, to allege that its investment philosophy was unsuitable is not the appropriate function of the Division.

According to its website, the Division is charged with enforcing the Massachusetts Securities Act “which was enacted to protect investors by prohibiting unlicensed and/or fraudulent activity.” While the complaint makes numerous allegations of fraudulent behavior, the Division has simply interposed its investment knowledge and judgment over that of a financial professional. It has determined that this particular investment adviser’s strategy was objectively and subjectively inappropriate. However, the Division only looked at a sampling of clients, with concentration in the energy sector, that experienced investment losses and concluded that these professionals provided unsuitable investment advice. The facts outlined in the complaint could apply to almost any investment adviser who had a bad day, week or month.

Nowhere in the complaint did they mention that the Division retained expert witnesses knowledgeable in finance or economics to confirm that this strategy was unsuitable. Instead, the Division relied on the benefit of hindsight and market performance to form the basis of their complaint. This complaint could have been written about almost any investment adviser during any bear market. Instead, this particular investment adviser was allocated to the wrong sector at the wrong time. For this reason, the complaint is entirely unjustified.

The Division should immediately rescind its complaint and allow these investors to pursue the normal avenues for recovering investment losses from their investment adviser instead of ruining the careers and reputations of two individuals.

 

 


[1] To an extent, all investing is gambling with calculated risks.

[2] The complaint stated that “roughly 30% of each client’s total portfolio was made of energy-related investments,” which can hardly be considered “primarily”. It could be said to be weighted towards energy-related investments, or even having a focus or concentration. However, to call a 30% allocation “primarily” invested is a blatant lie.

[3] However, in a footnote, the complaint acknowledges that it has used a calculation methodology that might have unfavorably skewed its figures. It appears to have used the initial investment amount as the numerator and the ending account balance as the denominator.



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Tuesday, March 26, 2019

How to Behave in the Courtroom

Anything can happen in court.  Last week, while in the midst of an appearance, I served as de facto wedding photographer.  Although the bride and groom were blissfully unaware of it, their wedding ceremony came as a welcome reprieve from an incredibly heated argument between me and my adversary, back in court just three months after finalizing our clients’ divorce.  It was hard to imagine that the parties – who had not only hired attorneys to argue on their behalf, but were also fighting with one another in the court room directly – had ever stood in the shoes of that bride and groom.

The entire episode served as a reminder that practicing family law is different.  Behind every legal issue is also an emotional thread that drives the parties.  Sometimes, this emotional component takes over and causes a good legal case to go haywire.  Nowhere can things go more wrong than in the courtroom.

Oftentimes, the same judge will be with your case for its entire lifetime.  Judges are people too, and the observation or opinion that one of the parties cannot control him or herself in their courtroom may impact their view of your case and, ultimately, their rulings.  Here is what I tell clients about how to behave in front of the judge, despite the emotional content of their cases:

  1. Don’t overreact.  Judges say things that can be upsetting.  A judge may make an observation that a party does not think is accurate or fair.  Or, the judge may make a decision that one party believes to be wrong or out of line.  Keep it to yourself.  Nobody likes a sore loser.  And by reacting negatively, you may be re-enforcing the judge’s already negative opinion of you.  By contrast, sometimes you’re on the other side of the equation and you are thrilled that your ex is FINALLY being read the riot act – and by a judge, no less.  Well, keep it to yourself.  Nobody likes a show-off, either.  This also applies to any friends or family members you might bring with you for moral support (who should probably wait outside the courtroom, anyway).
  2. When in doubt, act like you’re watching paint dry.  See above.  If you can’t control yourself, tune out.
  3. Dress appropriately.  As a party, you do not need to wear a suit to court.  But remember, again, judges are people too.  Just like everybody else, they are judging your appearance.  Don’t show up in an outfit that shows disrespect to the Court.
  4. Don’t speak unless spoken to.  If you hired an attorney, let the attorney do the talking.  You are paying your attorney to actually represent and speak for you, so let him or her do that.  If you start speaking on your own, you may say something against your own interest, or inadvertently reveal a privileged communication.  Plus, judges hate it!  They want order in their courtroom, and if the parties and the litigants are all arguing with one another, it is a disaster.  If the Judge asks you a question directly, keep it short and sweet.
  5. Don’t fight with your attorney, your ex, or your ex’s attorney.  At least not where the judge can see you.  Sometimes, emotions run high.  You might disagree with something your attorney said.  That is a privileged conversation that you should have with your attorney in private.  Undermining your attorney in front of the judge is not the way to help yourself.  Alternatively, you might be REALLY angry at something your ex or his/her attorney said about you in the courtroom. Let your attorney deal with that at the appropriate time.  And remember, the judge’s staff (his/her secretary, law clerk, court clerk, and officer) are an extension of the judge.  If they see the courthouse equivalent of the Fight of the Century happening – even if its outside of the courtroom itself – they are going to let the judge know about it.

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Jessica C. Diamond is an associate in the firm’s Family Law Practice, resident in the Morristown, NJ, office. You can reach Jessica at (973) 994.7517 or jdiamond@foxrothschild.com.



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Friday, March 22, 2019

New Law Bans Non-Disclosure of Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation Settlements

Confidential settlement agreements reached between employers and employees resolving claims of discrimination, retaliation, and harassment may not be so secret anymore.

On March 18, 2019, New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy signed into law Senate Bill 121, which amends the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 (“NJLAD”), by declaring unlawful and unenforceable any provision in any employment contract or settlement agreement concealing, or attempting to conceal, details relating to a claim of discrimination, retaliation, or harassment. Furthermore, and perhaps even more concerning to employers, the amendment prohibits the contractual waiver of any substantive or procedural rights or remedies relating to a claim of discrimination, retaliation or harassment.

Summarizing, effective March 18, 2019:

  • Provisions in employment contracts waiving (or purporting to waive) substantive or procedural rights or remedies relating to discrimination, retaliation, or harassment claims are unlawful;
  • Nondisclosure clauses in employment contracts and settlement agreements relating to workplace discrimination, retaliation, or harassment are unenforceable against current or former employees;
  • All settlement agreements between employers and employees resolving claims of discrimination, retaliation, or harassment must include “a bold, prominently placed notice that although the parties may have agreed to keep the settlement and underlying facts confidential, such a provision in an agreement is unenforceable against the employer if the employee publicly reveals sufficient details of the claim so that the employer is reasonably identifiable”;
  • Employers may not retaliate against an employee for refusing to sign an employment-related contract containing a waiver or nondisclosure provision relating to discrimination, retaliation or harassment;
  • Any employer who attempts to enforce a provision deemed void in violation of public policy under the Amendment will be liable for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the employee in defending that action;
  • Employees aggrieved by any employer violation of the Amendment may prosecute their claims by filing a lawsuit in the Superior Court of New Jersey; and
  • Claims brought pursuant to the Amendment have a 2-year statute of limitations, are fee-shifting, and are not exclusive of other statutory, common law, or other remedies available to employees.

The Amendment expressly excludes and does not apply to collective bargaining agreements between an employer and the collective bargaining representative of the employees. Similarly, the Amendment by its own terms does not seem to extend to employer non-compete, non-solicit, non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements.

Beyond that, however, the breadth and scope of the Amendment is sweeping. It appears to extend to “any” employment contract or settlement agreement that waives substantive or procedural rights and remedies relating to NJLAD claims. While it remains to be seen how this new law will be applied by the courts, the language of the Amendment may prohibit the enforcement of an employment agreement requiring the arbitration of discrimination, retaliation or harassment claims. In other words, an employer who seeks to enforce an arbitration clause against an employee pursuing discrimination, retaliation or harassment claims might not prevail in compelling arbitration and may have to pay the employees’ legal fees resulting from it.

Furthermore, settlement agreements between employers and employees relating to NJLAD claims may not require employees to conceal claim details. It appears employers may make confidential other terms and conditions of an employee settlement agreement, such as the settlement amount, payment terms, and consideration for the agreement, but claim details clearly may not be suppressed.

What does this mean for employers? From a practical perspective, going forward, any settlement agreements resolving claims of discrimination, harassment or retaliation must include the bold disclaimer against confidentiality. Additionally, employers must be mindful of the broad prohibition against confidentiality of claim details; once taken for granted, employers now must exercise care in seeking to implement and enforce any confidentiality with respect to an employee settlement agreement resolving NJLAD claims. Furthermore, given the seemingly broad application of the Amendment, employers should review their current employment contracts and other onboarding documents, which may be in conflict with the new law, to confirm compliance on a going-forward basis.

Whether you are an employer seeking guidance or concerned about compliance with respect to this new law, or an employee seeking recourse from discrimination, retaliation or harassment in the workplace, the labor and employment attorneys at Stark & Stark are here to help.



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Thursday, March 21, 2019

The Supreme Court Takes Up a Gun Permit Case

The Supreme Court announced late today that it has granted certification in In re Application for Permit to Carry a Handgun of Calvin Carlstrom.  The question presented on that appeal, as phrased by the Supreme Court Clerk’s office, is “Among other issues, was petitioner entitled to a hearing on his application for a permit to […]

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Five Reasons to Choose the Blossoming Attorney

When networking or meeting with a potential client, I am often asked: “Why should I hire you?”  Most people think that more experience is always better and, at first blush, that makes sense.  After all, if I were having surgery, I’d certainly want to go under the knife with a credentialed surgeon instead of a novice intern.  However, when it comes to the practice of law, especially family law, there can be a great benefit to using a neophyte attorney with a few years of experience under his or her belt. Here’s why:

  1. We think outside the box. “Maverick” is a synonym of “newcomer.” And do you know what a maverick is? One who takes chances and departs from the accepted course. Some veteran attorneys regale you with their war stories or boast an “I’ve seen it all” attitude. This experience is really valuable, but remember that years of experience does not always mean expertise.  The wrong kind of lawyer may be limited to his or her own ideas about what “kind of case” you have or how it will resolve in the end. Lawyers who are eager to get creative, come up with unique problem solutions and are not limited by their predictions and assumptions are invaluable. There’s also nothing more satisfying than being underestimated by your more experienced, condescending adversary, only to come up with better strategies.
  2. Our contacts are just as important (if not more important) than our mentors’. The big-wigs rub elbows with judges and other esteemed lawyers. They have visible positions on boards and bar associations and their walls are lined with accolades. Younger attorneys have equally valuable contacts, especially in the courthouse, where it really counts.  Many newer attorneys are recent law clerks and have firsthand knowledge of the way judges in their county think and rule.  They are familiar with the secretaries, court staff, and other administrators and know just who to call to answer a question or streamline a process. For several years after law school, our classmates are clerks in the courthouse and act as a valuable resource in practice.  Sometimes it pays more to know the bouncer than the headliner.
  3. We are cost-effective. This one’s obvious, but critical. Lawyers (especially in family law) are routinely paid by the hour for their services. With more experience, comes higher hourly rates. If managing costs is a big concern, selecting an attorney with three years versus twenty years of experience can make a huge difference to your bottom line.  If you expect your case to be relatively straightforward, selecting an attorney with a lower hourly rate may be your best cost-saving strategy.
  4. We are savvy information-seekers. I wanted to write this entire post without using the “m” word, but let’s face it, millennials are really good at technology. A smart millennial knows when to ask for help but also knows where to look. If you suspect your ex of cohabiting and you want to modify your alimony obligation, the conventional first step would be to hire a private investigator. A social media-savvy attorney may get the same answer with a targeted social media search (assuming you ex has lax privacy settings, of course). And when it comes to seeking answers, a good attorney, young or old, knows when to ask for help.  A wise, budding attorney will have a mentor who acts as a sounding board.  Even the most experienced attorneys sometimes need a second opinion, too.
  5. We hear you. Family law is emotionally taxing. Whether you’re negotiating a prenup, arguing over custody, navigating a divorce, or fighting with your ex after the fact, all of these issues can be draining, especially if they are high-conflict. The attorney with many years of practice invariably becomes immune to the emotional rollercoaster.  I’d dare say it’s a necessity to keep up with the practice. And you need a lawyer who can take the emotions out and give you objective counsel about your legal rights. A younger lawyer is trained to do just that, but can also empathize with your situation.  Some days you really need to be “heard”.  All great lawyers, old and young, have mastered this skill.  A newer attorney, who probably has less clients than the decorated expert, likely has more time and emotional bandwidth to do so.

Depending on your situation, it may be logical to go straight to the top. Maybe you have a very complicated case with a lot of moving parts.  Maybe your case has a long history and you need some reputational muscle to bring out the big guns and bring your matter to a close.  In these cases, this is strategically your best choice.  However, I invite you to reconsider your assumption that older is always wiser.  For the right type of case, the newer kid on the block just might be your greatest asset.

__________________________________________________________________

 

Katherine A. Nunziata, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLPKatherine A. Nunziata is an associate in the firm’s Family Law practice, based in the Morristown, NJ office. You can reach Katherine at (973-548-3324) or at knunziata@foxrothschild.com.



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Wednesday, March 20, 2019

Supreme Court Oral Argument Tips From Chief Justice Rabner

Chief justice Rabner was the guest speaker at last night’s NJSBA Appellate Practice Committee meeting.  He was aware that Judge Vernoia spoke at a previous meeting about appellate briefing, as reported here.  So he chose to focus his remarks on oral argument in the Supreme Court.  Though some of his points were specific to the […]

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Monday, March 18, 2019

Don’t Gamble with Love, or Confidential Information

Despite the fact that family courts are trending towards making divorce filings public records, there are certain documents that should not, and cannot be disclosed. The most important of these are evaluations that are conducted in custody disputes.

A California appeals court recently ruled that the Los Angeles attorney representing singer Paul Anka’s ex-wife, Anna, in a custody battle acted “maliciously” and ” recklessly” when she disclosed information contained in a confidential custody evaluation from a prior case during a deposition.

The information revealed contained details about the child and the parties which involved the singer’s first marriage. The attorney was sanctioned, and there were proceedings against the party who initially disclosed the information.

Closer to home, in New Jersey several years ago, a judge appointed a custody expert to conduct a best interests evaluation to determine what custody arrangement was in the best interests of the children. The evaluation was completed and sent to the judge.

The judge then gave copies to the parties and attorneys along with what is known as a confidentiality order. This is an order from the court which typically states that the information in the report is not to be disclosed and shared with anyone other than the parties, the attorneys and the court. The mother read the evaluation and was upset.

In violation of the confidentiality order, she confided in her sister and told the sister part of what the evaluation had said about her, and the father. The sister, horrified, then told the grandmother, who then convinced the daughter to allow her to read the report. Then, unable to keep it to herself, the he grandmother wrote a letter to the judge explaining all the things that the grandmother felt that the evaluator had gotten wrong.

The judge was furious, and sanctioned the mother thousands of dollars for disclosing the report in violation of the order. More importantly, the judge then had concerns about the mother and her truthfulness, which would last through the end of the case.

The judge also had concerns, and this is what is most important, that now that there were individuals that had the information, it would be inadvertently disclosed to the children who were the subject of the evaluation. A custody evaluation includes confidential information about the parties and the children, which, while important for a court to know when making a decisions, should not be disclosed to non-parties.

This information includes psychological testing results of the parties, and sometimes the children. Past and present mental health information is contained in the reports.

Divorce and custody disputes are some of the most difficult times a person will experience, absent illness or death of a loved one. It is human nature for us to want to have a person who we can confide in when going through these difficult times.

However, it is so important to remember that some things just absolutely cannot be shared. Talk to your lawyer, talk to yourself, or ask the court to allow you to discuss it with a therapist who would have a similar duty of confidentiality. But don’t talk about it to your family, your friends, and certainly not your mother!



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Registration Certificate Required for Copyright Infringement Suit

On March 4, 2019, the United States Supreme Court resolved a longstanding split among the circuit courts concerning what exactly the copyright registration prerequisite to filing a copyright lawsuit means – whether an application to register is sufficient or an actual issued registration is required. The Supreme Court chose the latter holding that a copyright owner must first obtain a copyright registration certificate from the Copyright Office before filing a copyright infringement suit.

In Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.Com, LLC, the plaintiff Fourth Estate, a news organization, licensed journalism works to the defendant Wall-Street.com, a news website, for use on its website for a prescribed time period. Defendant continued to keep the content up on the site after canceling the parties’ licensing agreement, allegedly breaching the license.

Because Fourth Estate had yet to register the content for copyright protection, it filed an application for registration with the Copyright Office at the same time as filing a copyright infringement suit against Wall-Street.com and its owner. The District Court dismissed the case, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Fourth Estate had to wait to bring an infringement suit until the copyright office made a decision on the pending application for registration.

While copyright registration is not required for valid copyright ownership – copyright is secured automatically when the work is “created,” i.e. fixed in a tangible medium like a copy or phonorecord—a registration is required in order to bring a lawsuit for copyright infringement. According to the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 411, a copyright lawsuit cannot be brought until “registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”

The meaning of the word “made” as used in that section has caused the rift between the circuit courts and is exactly what the Justices had to address in Wall-Street.Com. The Eleventh Circuit followed the “registration” approach, taking the position that registration is not “made” until the Copyright Office accepts the copyright and issues the registration certificate.

The Ninth and other Circuits took the “application” approach holding instead that registration is “made” as soon as the copyright registration application is filed and paid for. Many believe the “application” to be the fairer of the two given that the Copyright Office, on average, takes seven months to issue a certificate, thereby encroaching upon over 25% of the three-year statute of limitations on copyright infringement claims. Additionally, seven months is viewed by some as a long time for a copyright owner to have to wait to enforce his legal rights in an infringement dispute, especially in the digital age of instant media.

Justice Ginsburg, writing the opinion for a unanimous court, stated that the Eleventh Circuit’s registration approach was the only way to read the statute satisfactorily given that “[t]he phrase ‘registration . . . has been made’’ refers to the Copyright Office’s act of granting registration, not to the copyright claimant’s request for registration.”

Ginsburg argued that certain exceptions to the registration requirement strengthened this view. Specifically, Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act contains an exception and allows parties to file an infringement suit after an application is filed and rejected. So, if the party could have filed an infringement suit under the Ninth Circuit’s application approach as soon as the application was submitted and paid for, then that provision would be rendered superfluous.

Additionally, Section 408 grants a “preregistration” option for copyright owners in fear of prepublication infringement, along with an exception that permits these owners to file suit before registration is completed. This provision was also reasoned to be unnecessary if “made” was interpreted to mean as soon as the application was completed and paid for.

Equally important, Congress considered but rejected a bill in 1993 to amend the Copyright Act to allow alleged infringed parties to file suit immediately upon submission of a copyright application. Arguments were raised that forcing copyright owners to wait for registration would leave them in a state of legal limbo and could have “a monumental impact on an authority’s ability to protect the fruits of her creative endeavors.” Although Ginsburg acknowledged the pitfalls of the administrative lag, those pitfalls were an insufficient reason to revise congressionally composed text. That was a problem Congress could alleviate but which the Supreme Court could not cure.

The case contains many takeaways for copyright owners. For example, if a copyright owner fears that her work is presently or likely to be infringed upon, she is encouraged to seek registration or preregistration with the Copyright Office. If she fails to seek registration right away and she later learns of infringement, the length of time it will take her to obtain the registration will eat away at the statute of limitations period. If she is concerned with timing, she could always invoke the Copyright Office’s “special handling” process, which would allow her to obtain a certificate within a matter of a few days, but that would cost an extra $800 and depends on how many other “special handling” applicants are in queue.

This SCOTUS decision aside, there are many benefits of registration.

First, registration serves as a public record of the author’s copyright claim, negating the innocent infringer defense.

Second, if registered within five years of publication, the registration will be prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and the facts stated in the certificate.

Third, if registration is obtained within three months of publication or prior to an infringement of the work, statutory damages and attorney’s fees will be available to the copyright owner in litigation. Otherwise, the owner can only get an award of actual damages and the defendant’s profits.

Lastly, the U.S. Customs Service, upon receipt of a registration certificate, could also bar the importation of pirated or counterfeit works into the U.S.



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Friday, March 15, 2019

Thirteen Years Since Perez v. Rent-A-Center

On March 15, 2006, the Supreme Court decided Perez v. Rent-A-Center, 186 N.J. 188 (2006).  By a 6-1 vote, with Justice Rivera-Soto issuing a partial dissent, the Court held in an opinion by Justice Long that “rent-to-own” contracts are subject to the Retail Installment Sales Act, N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1 et seq. (“RISA”), to the interest rate […]

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Thursday, March 14, 2019

Tracking Your Spouse Can Result in a Final Restraining Order Even When You Ask Your Dad for Help

In the recent unpublished decision of L.G. v. T.G.. the Appellate Division addresses an issue that we are dealing with more and more – tracking one’s spouse through a hidden GPS on their car.  GPS in terms of domestic violence isn’t necessarily “new” – you can read about the beginnings in Eric Solotoff’s 2011 blog.  But this case also demonstrates that having a third party contract the private investigator services does not protect a defendant/spouse from entry of a final restraining order (“FRO”) based upon stalking and that reviewing the information/using it against the victim can also lead to the FRO based upon harassment.  Of note, although not explicitly stated, is that the tracking/private investigation was not intended to assist the defendant’s case, such as for cohabitation, but rather the opinion reads as though the only purpose of tracking the plaintiff was to learn about and question her whereabouts.  Other important factors that we often see, and which the court considered, include that the defendant was the sole wage earner and can therefore exert financial control against the plaintiff and the defendant used his larger physical stature to instill fear in the plaintiff.  In this very thorough decision, before addressing the merits of the appeal, the Appellate Division specifically stated that it “defer[s] to the judge’s thoughtful findings on this subject because those findings were solidly grounded on the judge’s credibility findings – he found L.G. much more credible than T.G., who was evasive – as well as other reliable evidence”.

In L.G., the Complaint for Divorce was filed in July 2017 following an approximate thirteen year marriage that commenced in 2004 and fell apart due to financial issues related to L.G.’s spending habits, including spending down the parties’ joint accounts, their daughter’s accounts, defendant’s inheritance and substantial credit card charges, causing T.G. to place her on a budget. The relevant restraining order in L.G. occurred after the divorce complaint was filed and after L.G. dismissed a pre-complaint temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against T.G.   That initial TRO resulted from a telephone call and text message exchange between the parties in response to T.G. closing their joint bank account.

Back to the TRO at issue here… Approximately three months post-complaint in October 2017, T.G. had his father retain a private investigator to conduct surveillance on L.G., including by having a GPS tracking device placed on her vehicle without her knowledge.  L.G. did not discover the device for nearly a month. During this period, there were 88 successful logins to view activity on the GPS that provided real-time whereabouts and approximately 391 updates from the GPS.  L.G. was followed personally for about three days.  Also during this period, and on the day that L.G. discovered the GPS, T.G.  questioned L.G. about her whereabouts and evasively confronted her with information he knew  from the tracking device before she knew it existed.  The parties got into an argument and each of them obtained a TRO against the other.  Following a trial, L.G. was granted an FRO and T.G.’s TRO was dismissed.

L.G.’s FRO was entered based upon the predicate acts of stalking and harassment – both of which stem from the GPS.  The statute guiding the predicate act of stalking is:

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b)

  • [a] person is guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth degree, if he purposefully or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety or the safety of a third person or suffer other emotional distress.

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a)

  • For the purposes of this statute:
    • (1) “Course of conduct” means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person; directly or indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means, following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating to or about a person, or interfering with a person’s property; repeatedly committing harassment against a
      person; or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed by any other means of communication or threats implied by conduct of a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.
    • (2) “Repeatedly” means on two or more occasions.
    • (3) “Emotional distress” means significant suffering or distress.
    • (4) “Cause a reasonable person to fear” means to cause fear which a reasonable victim, similarly situated, would have under the circumstances.

T.G. came up with plenty of defenses regarding the GPS, including that “he did not personally install it; he never threatened her; he did not personally maintain visual and physical proximity to her ; and that his behavior was not persistent because it occurred over a one week period”  However, the Appellate Division didn’t buy it.  Rather, the court looked to the purpose of the stalking statute to “cast a wide net of protection for stalking victims by broadly prohibiting and punishing persistent, unwanted, and frightening behaviors” and “to intervene in repetitive harassing or threatening behavior before the victim has actually been physically attacked”.  The court also looked to the purpose of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act to assure the maximum protection to victims.  Against this background, the court did not forgive T.G. because the device was on L.G.’s car as opposed to inside the home, such as in a bathroom or bedroom where L.G. would have a greater expectation of privacy.  Additionally, the court did not buy T.G.’s arguments that he should avoid the consequences of an FRO because he did not physically place the GPS on L.G.’s car and instead authorized his dad to do so.   Ultimately, the Appellate Division opined that “[i]ndirectly and through a third party, T.G. had L.G. followed, monitored, observed, and surveilled, by using adevice in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a).”

The Appellate Division then turned to harassment, which incorporated the same behavior from the above stalking, although not placement of the GPS itself. The statute guiding the predicate act of harassment is:

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4:

  • a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;
  • b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.

Here, the trial court found that while the GPS was not harassment as T.G. did not intend for L.G. to detect the device, he did use the information obtained from the GPS to intentionally harass, intimidate and try to trap L.G., as well as to cause alarm and serious annoyance.

As to the history of violence and need for protection, the trial court found L.G.’s testimony credible regarding her fear of T.G. and need for an FRO to “feel safe with her kids”, as well as the parties’ prior arguments including an incident when T.G. said to L.G. “do you know what one punch will do to your face?”, as well as the physical incident when T.G. pushed and pinned down L.G. and, as L.G. later testified, threw her phone against the wall.  T.G. had also demanded access to her phone and contacts.

When I said this opinion was thorough, I wasn’t kidding, but it’s important.  The takeaway here is to think twice about placing a GPS on a spouse’s vehicle.  This is especially true when the surveillance has no bearing on your underlying claims and is merely for personal knowledge.  It also doesn’t matter that you may feel aggrieved by your spouse for spending habits or similar reasons.  Remember, even your dad can’t get you out of this one.


Lindsay A. Heller is an associate in the firm’s Family Law practice, based in its Morristown, NJ office. You can reach Lindsay at 973.548.3318 or lheller@foxrothschild.com.

Lindsay A. Heller, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP



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Wednesday, March 13, 2019

The Supreme Court Takes on a Lot More Work

Today, the Supreme Court announced that it has granted review in nine more cases.  That is many more cases than are usually accepted for review at one time, though it has been 30 days since the Court last announced grants of review.  Six of the cases involve grants of certification, two are before the Court […]

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Paul Matey is Confirmed to a Seat on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

Yesterday, the Senate voted 54-43 to confirm Paul Matey to a seat on the Third Circuit.  The vote largely followed party lines, with Senator Joe Manchin (D- WV) the only Democrat to vote in favor of the nomination.  The Senate deviated (and not for the first time under the current Administration) from what had been […]

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Tuesday, March 12, 2019

Equitable Remedies for Ex-Spouses Who Lost Their Share of a Military Pension Due to the Military Spouse’s Receipt of Disability Benefits

Divorces involving a spouse in the military generally involve unique issues.  In the recently published decision of Fattore v. Fattore, the Appellate Division held that the trial court cannot replace, “dollar for dollar”, an ex-spouse’s benefit from a military pension that was lost after the military spouse elected to receive disability benefits.  Doing so is against Congress’ intent to omit such disability benefits from veteran retirement pay that is otherwise subject to equitable distribution.  However, the trial court may treat the lost pension benefits as a change in circumstances warranting alimony and/or an alimony modification for the spouse who lost his/her share of their ex-spouses military pension.  This is true even when there is an alimony waiver as part of the parties’ divorce, which is what the parties had in Fattore.  After all, the family court is a court of equity and so we should expect, and hope for, some sort of an equitable result.

Okay, that was a mouthful!  It’s not often that our New Jersey family law cases explore military law, Congressional intent and/or United States Supreme Court cases.  In order to better understand the complexities here, and delve into that Federal law, let’s break this down with the relevant facts:

  • When the parties divorced in 1997, they both agreed to waive alimony from the other.  They distributed the equity in the marital home.  They also divided their pensions in equitable distribution, with each party being entitled to 50% of the marital portion of each other’s pension.  Plaintiff/ex-wife had a pension through her employment as an operating nurse and Defendant/ex-husband had a pension through his service in the Army National Guard. Defendant was still serving in the Army National Guard at the time of their divorce.
  • The parties obtained a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) following their divorce, which is the Order that allows for distribution of a retirement account in the event of a divorce without taxes and penalties typically associated with retirement account withdrawals.
  • In 2002, Defendant became disabled and, accordingly, was forced into retirement from the Army. Upon becoming disabled, Defendant was authorized to collect his pension and Social Security benefits.  After collecting his pension for some time, Defendant elected to receive tax-free disability benefits.  Defendant’s receipt of these disability benefits eliminated Plaintiff’s share of the Army pension.
  • In the meantime, Plaintiff was unaware that Defendant’s pension was in pay status, while Defendant believed that Plaintiff was collecting her proper share.  Plaintiff learned that her share of the pension was forfeited after she contacted the Army offices regarding the status of her payments that she never received.
  • In 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking compensation for her equitably distributed share of Defendant’s pension that she lost by virtue of Defendant collecting disability.  The trial court held that Defendant must pay Plaintiff a tax-free equitable distribution payment of $1,800 per month pending  a pension appraisal that the trial court ordered to determine the value of the Army pension at the time of the parties’ divorce.  Notably, Plaintiff sought alimony in lieu of the pension payment but the trial court denied that request, holding that alimony does not replace equitable distribution.
  • Three months after the trial court’s decision, but before the Appellate Division decision, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in the matter of Howell v. Howell, based on an Arizona family law case.  To understand Howell, we must first know that Congress had previously enacted USFSPA, which permits state courts to equitably distribute “disposable retired pay” except for such retirement pay that is waived because of disability benefits.  That waived pay is excluded from equitable distribution.  This is the exact issue faced by the parties in Fattore.
  • The Supreme Court in Howell, as cited by Fattore, held that “a military pension, which has been equitably distributed, is not a vested right, but rather, a contingent benefit where the pension is later reduced as a result of a veteran’s disability and”

 [t]he state court did not extinguish (and most likely would not have had the legal power to extinguish) that future contingency. The existence of that contingency meant that the value of [the wife’s] share of military retirement pay was possibly worth less—perhaps less than [the wife] and others thought—at the time of the divorce.

  • The Supreme Court in Howell further found that state courts cannot overcome Congress’ intent to omit disability benefits from disposable retirement pay.  In other words, to give the spouse “dollar for dollar” what he/she lost from the pension due to the military spouse’s disability benefits is contrary to Congress’ intent when enacting USFSPA.

Now that we have the background, let’s talk about the Appellate Division’s holding:

Close up of wooden gavel isolated on white background

  • Following Howell, which the trial court did not have at the time it decided this case, the Appellate Division reversed the decision because the trial court’s order for a pension evaluation and, seemingly, “dollar for dollar” replacement of the amount Plaintiff lost from Defendant’s pension was contrary to USFSPA and Howell.
  • The Appellate Division rejected potential remedies of (1) contractual enforcement/indemnification because the parties did not have such an agreement; (2) offset or reallocation of equitable distribution because of the amount of time that passed and, importantly, “equitable distribution is final and not subject to a change in circumstances”; and (3) res judicata because the Supreme Court had already issued an opinion in the case of Mansell, holding that a veteran’s retirement benefits lost due to collecting disability benefits are not disposable retired pay that is subject to equitable distribution.
  • Ultimately, the Appellate Division held that an alimony award may be the appropriate remedy notwithstanding the parties’ alimony waiver at the time of their divorce.  In order to get around this waiver, the Appellate Division cited prior case law standing for the proposition that Family Part judges have “a broad supervisory role” to determine whether a divorce agreement is fair, and that Family Part judges have “greater discretion when interpreting such agreements”.  The Appellate Division also noted the parties’ duty of fairness to each other, which is separate from the judge’s duty to assure fairness.  The Court did not stop there – it continued by citing to the parties’ income disparity at the time of their divorce (with Defendant earning 34% more than Plaintiff) and the fact that Plaintiff gave “valuable consideration” in exchange for the alimony waiver.  Notably, the Court stated:

[T]he unforeseeable loss of the bargained for pension benefit was a substantial and permanent change in circumstances, which invalidated the waiver.  Upholding the alimony waiver in these circumstances would be wholly unfair.

While there is a lot to digest from this opinion, the security it offers is something special about the Family Part being a Court of Equity.  Of course, the military spouse who thinks he/she has an alimony waiver may not feel so secure.  It therefore follows that this decision provides good practice tips for divorce matters with spouses in the military – Rather than going with the typical division of retirement benefits by way of QDRO, we may want to consider an offset in equitable distribution that avoids having the distribute a military pension and, thus, the potential loss to the non-military spouse.


Lindsay A. Heller is an associate in the firm’s Family Law practice, based in its Morristown, NJ office. You can reach Lindsay at 973.548.3318 or lheller@foxrothschild.com.

Lindsay A. Heller, Associate, Fox Rothschild LLP



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Today’s Third Circuit Opinion: “Argued October 28, 2015 (Opinion Filed March 12, 2019)”

Komis v. Secretary of the United States Department of Labor, ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 2019).  This opinion by Judge Scirica today affirmed the result of a jury trial in this Title VII retaliation and retaliatory hostile work environment case.  Judge Scirica encapsulated virtually the entire ruling of the panel in the second paragraph of […]

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The Anniversary of Trentacost v. Brussel

On this date in 1980, the Supreme Court decided Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214 (1980).  As stated by Justice Pashman, who wrote the majority opinion, the question there was “whether a landlord who provides inadequate security for common areas of rental premises may be liable for failing to prevent a criminal assault upon a […]

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Monday, March 11, 2019

Stock Awards in Divorce Revisited

To be or not to be vested—that is the question. Well, at least that was the question considered by a New Jersey appeals court in the recent decision of M.G. v. S.G.

Otherwise stated, the question concerned whether a stock award which was issued to an employee prior to a divorce filing but which was vested after the divorce complaint was filed be subject to equitable distribution between the parties. Typically, any assets obtained prior to the date of the divorce filing are subject to be included as a marital asset under New Jersey law. While this may seem cut and dry at first glance, nuance can be found in all aspects of law. This recent decision sheds some light on this sort of question which has vexed divorce lawyers and now appears to have an answer, albeit one that requires still more lawyering.

The court reaffirmed that although marriage is a “shared enterprise,” the date an award is received does not necessarily govern the outcome which rests on the employer’s requirements for the award to vest—that is, to become available to the employee.

As a “high level corporate employee in a highly competitive industry” M.G.’s stock award were “subject to his level of proficiency” rather than merely good work or continued employment. Since M.G.’s post complaint efforts were an essential element of the calculus, a portion of the stock award was therefore not divisible with S.G.

The court went on to establish a standard for future cases by reviving the “marital momentum” theory which many lawyers had prematurely discarded from their tool kits. In essence, the party seeking to exclude a stock award issued during marriage would have the burden of proving that the award was made for future services instead of a form of deferred compensation relating back to the award date.

While this involves a legal balancing act, the court skillfully identified and resolved the problem for which it deserves credit from lawyers, judges and divorcing parties in the months and years ahead.



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Protecting Your Brewery, Brew Pub or Distillery’s Trade Secrets, Confidential Information and Customers From Former Employees

Your company’s recipes, methodologies and customer base are what distinguish it from the competition. If this information is disclosed to third parties, it could detrimentally hurt your business because a competitor could seemingly replicate the same or similar beverage. It is important that you protect your company’s trade secrets, customer relationship and other confidential information from employees, especially the brew master or distiller, in the event the employment relationship ends.

The good news is that New Jersey, like many other states, has recognized three categories of interests that may be legitimately protected:  (1) employer’s trade secrets, (2) employer’s confidential information, and (3) protection of customer relationships. However, the general rule is that a former employee may utilize information from a prior employer with a new employer or new business after his term of service has expired. That could lead to the dissemination of your trade secrets to a competitor or a new company formed by the former employee to directly compete with your business. In order to protect your businesses’ trade secrets, confidential information and customer relationships it is critical that proper employment planning is takes place.  Before or during the course of employment, the employee must agree to be restricted from competing with your business through a covenant not to compete, i.e., a restrictive covenant or non-compete agreement.

In most cases, a non-compete agreement can effectively limit the specified geographic area where a former employee can work, the type of job that the former employee can engage in, and the duration of the restricted type of work. The terms of the non-compete agreement must be “reasonable” in scope, location and duration in order to protect the interests of the employer. The timing of entry into the non-compete agreement is also important. Generally, entry into the agreement must take place at the inception of the employment relationship or when the employee receives a raise or promotion.

These are only a few examples of the issues that your business must consider in connection with its employees, especially the brew master or distiller, who knows your company’s trade secrets, confidential information and customers. Due to the importance of these issues, counsel should be consulted to help protect your brewery, brew pub or distillery’s trade secrets, confidential information and customer relationships.

For more information on Stark & Stark’s Beer & Spirits Group, please click here.



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Thursday, March 7, 2019

A Blast From the Past: The Entire Controversy Doctrine and Legal Malpractice Claims

Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuoo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., ___ N.J. ___ (2019).  In 1997, the Supreme Court decided Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424 (1997).  That decision held, among other things, that the entire controversy doctrine does not require the assertion of a legal malpractice claim in the underlying action that gives rise […]

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Judge Porter Issues His First Precedential Opinion

Madar v. Unites States Citizenship and Immigration Services, ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 2019).  Having been confirmed by the Senate as the newest member of the Third Circuit in October 2018, Judge Porter today issued his first precedential opinion.  In short, the issue was whether plaintiff, who was born outside the United States, was entitled […]

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Wednesday, March 6, 2019

The Local Government Ethics Law and Super Storm Sandy

Mondsini v. Local Finance Board, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2019).  This opinion by Judge Messano deals with an issue under the Local Government Ethics Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.1 to -22.5 (“LGEL”) that was occasioned by Super Storm Sandy in 2012.  Plaintiff was the Executive Director of the Rockaway Valley Regional Sewerage Authority.  “The Authority […]

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Tuesday, March 5, 2019

A Unanimous Opinion by Judge Ambro, With a Concurring Opinion by Judge Ambro and Judge Greenaway. Huh?

United States v. Reese, ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 2019).  The Third Circuit issued this opinion today.  As Judge Ambro’s opinion for the unanimous panel stated at the very beginning, “This is one of the rare cases in which the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§3161–3174, requires that we vacate a conviction and remand for […]

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Will I Need an Expert Witness for My Divorce?

One of the most important things to remember during the divorce is process is that every divorce is different. The process your friend or family member described to you may not be the same for you. Accordingly, although your colleague may have needed an expert for their divorce, you may not. Generally, in cases which involve businesses, high net-worth issues, or contentious custody situations, it could be appropriate or even necessary to have an expert witness.

New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702 governs expert testimony and states “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”

There are a wide variety of qualified individuals who may have specialized knowledge required and who may be necessary to testify during your case.

Perhaps the most common expert needed in a divorce matter is a child custody expert. Custody experts are often used in contentious custody matters to offer the court a recommendation as to what is best for the child. A child custody expert is often a mental health expert who meets with the child, parents, and may also speak to other close family members.

Another common expert is a forensic accountant, who can assist in matters such as alleged dissipation of assets or valuing a business. Forensic accountants review financial information and provide often necessary insight into disputed financial circumstances.

These are just a few examples of expert witnesses that may be necessary in a divorce case. However, there are many different types of experts, which may be needed for a variety of reasons. Another important consideration is the cost of using an expert.

Oftentimes, experts can be costly and you will need to discuss the pros and cons of using an expert with your attorney. For example, if you and your spouse disagree as to the value of an asset but the asset has very little value, it may not be wise to retain an expert to resolve this dispute.

Our family law attorneys have experience working with a wide variety of professionals and can advise you as to any experts necessary in your case. Certainly, not every divorce will need an expert. Again, every divorce process is unique and what was necessary in one case may not be necessary in yours.



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